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The relationship between the United States of America and the People’s Republic of 
China is arguably one of the most closely observed relationship on a global scale. The 
state of the relationship between these two superpowers determines much of multilateral 
relationships. For decades, the U.S. mainly maintained peaceful and constructive 
relations with the PRC, as an attempt to keep the nation open and receptive to foreign 
actors. However, with China’s rapid development in the 21st century, the relationship 
began to change. Gradually the U.S. became concerned of the true intentions of the PRC 
and of the challenges China’s development presented to the U.S. in multiple fields.  
This thesis observes these changes in the bilateral relations during the Obama and 
Trump administrations. The aim is to analyze how the China discourse has developed in 
2010-2021, and how the U.S. administrative documents reflect its relations to China 
from the perspective of International Relations theories. The analysis is conducted from 
chosen administrative papers and documents concerning the national security of the 
United States. These texts include documents such as the National Security Strategy, the 
National Defense Strategy, and regional strategies concerning Asia. With discourse 
analysis, this thesis observes the gradual transition from diplomatic neutrality and 
cultural respect toward a formation of threat perceptions and strategic competition.  
The administrative documents revealed a notable change in the China discourse, 
reflecting a shift from cooperative liberalism to strategic realism as the core narrative. 
The Obama administration maintained the U.S.-China relations from a perspective of 
peaceful cooperation and showed careful diplomacy when discussing China. However, 
the tone of the China discourse experienced a gradual shift toward realism, when the 
Obama administration began questioning the intentions of China and reflected concern 
on intellectual espionage conducted by the Chinese government. From the perspective 
of indirect illocutionary intentions, the Obama documents were filled with indirect 
discussions on repressive governments and challenging ideologies that are threatening 
the liberal world order.  
The China threat assessment truly sparked during the Trump administration, when 
direct accusations and provocative means were directed at China. Despite a peaceful 
and cooperative beginning of U.S.-China relations during the Trump administration, the 
relationship quickly turned hostile. The Trump administration relied on direct 
illocutionary acts by promising to meet the challenges China posed and return the 
United States to its leadership position in all fields. The administration abandoned the 
liberal notions the U.S. had promoted before and faced China with a strategy based on 
principled realism. The familiar cooperative coexistence was now replaced with a 
strategic competition for global hegemony.  
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Since the stabilization of the U.S. – China relations more than half a century ago, the 
relationship has undergone significant changes from the U.S. either attempting to 
engage China or contain it. These fluctuating attempts have intensified the tension 
between the two superpowers, and a possible conflict could have tremendous 
consequences, both regionally in the Asia-Pacific and worldwide. The assertiveness of 
the rising China has demanded a more comparative approach from the U.S. 
administration in the 21st century. Today, the U.S. observes China challenging its global 
leadership position, and the administrations of the 21st century are responding 
accordingly to defend the hegemonic position of the United States. Gradually, the time 
of engagement and cooperation is being replaced with a constant power competition. 
 
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the fluctuations of the relationship of the 
United States and China. While the focus of this paper is on the administrations of 
Barack Obama and Donald J. Trump, it is important to understand how the relationship 
has evolved during the previous decades and what were the general strategies of 
previous U.S. administrations concerning China. The consequences of earlier 
approaches affect the policies implemented today. 
 
U.S.-China Relations from the Eighteenth to the Twenty-first century 
 
U.S.-China relations begun in 1784, when the first American ship reached the harbors 
of Canton. (Wang 2013, 1.) Ever since, the then newly established United States and the 
gradually declining Qing empire had regular economic, social, cultural, and political 
contacts. The young nation-state of the U.S. joined the global trade hub of Asia, and 
gradually gained a strong position among the imperial powers in the regional markets. 
While the U.S. advanced its economic development, the Qing empire failed to utilize 
the opportunities the imperial powers and the U.S. provided with trade. For example, 
the empire lacked the institutionalized strategies to capitalize the flowing foreign 
currencies. (Wang 2013, 21.)  
 
However, the establishment of the early relations introduced these two nations to each 
other, even though it seemed more beneficial to the United States, which was quickly on 
its way to a powerful nation-state. During the following century, the Qing China had to 
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endure the defeat in the Opium Wars, the American ‘Open Door’ doctrine, and the 
unfair treaties conducted by the imperial powers and the United States. (Wang 2013, 
45.) The Opium Wars (1839-42, 1856-60) between Britain and Qing China, provoked 
by the trade, especially on opium, remark as the starting point for the ‘century of 
humiliation’ for China. The ‘century of humiliation’ has ever since been a constant 
reminder in China, especially when the country was led by Mao Zedong, of their past 
relationship with the Western powers, and how these nations took advantage of the 
Chinese, and therefore, leaving the nation in a stagnated state. (Scott 2008, xi.) While 
the relationship between Britain and China deteriorated during the wars, the United 
States increased its involvement in Qing China, focusing on more diplomatic and 
respectful bilateral relations, and eventually obtaining treaties considered more 
beneficial than those of the imperial nations. (Wang 2013, 54.)  
 
In the aftermaths of the Second Opium War, the United States conducted the ‘Open 
Door’ policy. Unlike the imperial states, which were pursuing Chinese territory, the 
U.S. focused on sustaining an open trade with China, while defending its administrative 
and territorial integrity from the imperial powers. (Wang 2013, 60.) However, the 
policy closely supported the American commercial interests by treating the nation as an 
open trade hub with unequal agreements for the Chinese. Additionally, it strongly relied 
on Chinese political and economic reforms. China, however, perceived the American 
attempts as ‘economic aggression’ and an imperialist way to ‘exterminate China’ (Wang 
2013, 62). This notion was not directed to the U.S. alone, but to all the nations aiming to 
take advantage of China with unfair treaties. Despite the perspective, these attempts to 
shape the Chinese society in favor to the pursuits of American interests was the 
prevailing geopolitical strategy of the United States from the early stages of the bilateral 
relations.  
 
In the turn of the 20th century, the two nations entered an era of new geopolitical 
challenges. The Qing empire was overthrown by the first Republic of China in 1912, 
which began to form its new governance and economic models based on outside 
influences from the Western world. Moreover, the new Republic pursued equal 
treatment from and inclusion in the international system. Meanwhile, the United States 
was pursuing global hegemonic position while the Europe was at war. Gaining global 
economic and political power, the U.S. begun constructing a liberal international 
system, with a seemingly strong indication that the United States should function as its 
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spokesman.  As for bilateral relations, China relied on the global leadership position on 
the U.S., especially as it was confronted by the imperialist Japan.  
 
China became a relative concern for the U.S. when the Chinese civil war broke between 
the Nationalists (Kuomintang) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Despite 
opposing communism, the U.S. did not directly aid the Nationalists, except for against 
Japanese invasions. By 1949, the Nationalists were driven to Taiwan, and the mainland 
(the People’s Republic of China, PRC) was now under the rule of the CCP. In the West, 
the main concern was who was that who ‘lost China’ (The Office of the Historian of the 
U.S. Department of State 2000.) Whether the CCP became eventually the stronger party 
because of the Soviet intervention to the civil war, or the lack of American support for 
the Kuomintang remains a debate. According to the China White Paper conducted by 
the Truman administration, the U.S. remained neutral in the civil war, because the 
American intervention would have not made a difference in the outcome. Therefore, the 
Truman administration was considered willing to leave China for the Communists. (The 
Office of the Historian of the U.S. Department of State 2000.) Supposedly, the U.S. did 
not officially support the Nationalists in the Chinese civil war to prevent aggravation of 
the U.S.-Soviet relations, and therefore reducing risks of misinterpretation for a 
provocation to a war with the Soviet Union.  
 
During the following decades the relationship between the U.S. and the PRC was 
mainly determined by the American relationship with Republic of China (ROC) in 
Taiwan, and by the regional wars between communist and democratic systems. While 
never officially at war against each other, U.S. and China fought on the opposite sides 
in the Korean war in the early 1950s, and in the following Vietnam war until mid-
1970s. However, the tension escalated to a near armed conflict between the U.S. and the 
PRC during the Taiwan Strait crises in 1954 and 1958, when the PRC conducted 
aggressive military actions towards the ROC. (Zhang 2019, 190.) As a result, the U.S.-
China relationship was tense and lacked mutual trust, and the only official connections 
were the occasional ambassadorial talks until the early 1970s.  
 
In 1960, President Eisenhower became the first U.S. president to make an official visit 
to a Chinese government, when he visited Chiang Kai-Shek in Taiwan. (The Office of 
the Historian of the U.S. Department of State 2000.) This visit supported the notion of 
the U.S defending the Nationalists by discouraging the mainland from invading the 
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sovereignty of Taiwan. Additionally, the U.S. kept pushing economic reforms in 
Taiwan – shaping it to fit the liberal international system.  
 
In the 60s, the Sino-Soviet relationship estranged, and the Nixon administration made 
retrospective efforts to improve the U.S.-China relations. Instead of isolating China, the 
U.S. focus was on isolating the Soviet Union from its satellite states. However, during 
the preceding administrations of Kennedy and Johnson, the main China policy revolved 
around the containment attempts of the communist PRC. As for the Nixon 
administration, the strategy focused on forming bilateral relations and building on 
mutual trust. For example, the Nixon Doctrine meant reducing U.S. military 
commitments in the Taiwan Strait. (The Office of the Historian of the U.S. Department 
of State 2000.) 
 
Due to the lack of diplomatic relations, the relationship was mainly maintained by the 
ambassadorial discussions held abroad, throughout the 1960s the relationship was 
influenced heavily by the distrust and the uncertainty of the political intentions, 
reciprocally. However, the ambassadorial talks became fruitful in the early 1970s, when 
the U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger organized a secret visit to China. 
(The Office of the Historian of the U.S. Department of State 2000.) After meeting with 
Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, Kissinger paved the road for the normalization the official 
relations between the nations and opened the communication between the heads of state. 
 
The diplomatic relationship between the United States of America and the People’s 
Republic of China took a significant step forward in 1972 when President Nixon met 
with Chairman Mao to establish the outlines of the newly stabilized – yet not officially 
diplomatic – relationship. In a communique, they agreed on issues that are still relevant 
today in bilateral relations concerning regional affairs; each nation should have the 
sovereignty of their own territory, neither should intervene in the internal or external 
affairs of the other, and a military conflict should be avoided at all costs. In addition, 
both parties agreed not to seek regional hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, and the U.S. 
agreed to reduce its military capacity in Taiwan when regional tensions were less 
significant. (The Office of the Historian of the U.S. Department of State 2019.) These 
aspects were to become the foundation on which to build mutual trust and cooperation. 




The American desire to ‘shape China politically, socially, religiously, economically, 
and strategically’ has prevailed since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979 
during the Carter administration. (Shambaugh 2010). The U.S. attempts of shaping, 
engaging, integrating, and strategically hedging China have been the cornerstones of the 
U.S. strategic approach to the region. To influence the development of China, different 
U.S. administrations have implemented these strategies differently, yet all in the pursue 
of American interests abroad. This American desire to shape the Chinese society to its 
likeness has been on-going for centuries.  
 
However, during the past decades, the shaping strategy mainly focused on 
nongovernmental interaction: the U.S. aimed to develop the educational and scientific 
communication between the two societies. By enabling scientific exchange, funding 
programs, and forming nongovernmental organizations in China, the U.S. hoped to push 
Chinese institutions towards liberalism and openness by teaching the Chinese society of 
Western values and democracy. According to Shambaugh (2010), eventually this was 
expected to lead to a liberalization of the political system. This type of strategy 
resembled much of the interaction U.S. had with China in the late 19th century: 
missionary work with paternalist features. (Shambaugh 2010). 
 
The shaping strategy, however, contributed to bilateral tension and distrust. For 
example, the bilateral relations experienced fractions during the Regan administration 
(1981-1989), when the U.S. openly strengthened the partnership with Taiwan, while the 
following administration of George H.W. Bush (1989-1993) had to deal with the global 
disapproval of Chinese behavior in its suppression of democratic demolitions in 
Tiananmen in 1989. (CFR 2020.)  
 
To further impact in the shaping of the Chinese society, the U.S. applied a strategy of 
engagement. However, after the Tiananmen incident, the term ‘engagement’ became a 
synonym for tough negotiations over sensitive issues (Shambaugh 2010). The early U.S. 
engagement with China was based on advancing American interests, democracy, and 
changing Chinese behavior to fit the international box of norms. However, as Bader 
notes (2018), maintaining relations, especially after 1989, have been difficult and 




While the shaping strategy focused on shaping the Chinese society, the engagement 
strategy was aimed at the governmental level. An important aspect of this strategy was 
building bilateral cooperation. Especially, after the Cold War, forming closer 
relationships (ministerial, provincial, city, and university ‘sister’ relationships) was 
essential for relieving hostility and clearing the air. According to Shambaugh (2010), 
forming institutionalized cooperation at different levels – engaging China –  could 
function as a buffer: with a foundation of strategic cooperation, if conflicts were to 
arise, the U.S. could effortlessly continue governmental interactions through other 
levels. 
 
Engagement became an official strategy during the Clinton administration (1993-2001). 
The administration applied a strategy of constructive engagement to promote 
cooperation. After the tensions caused by the Tiananmen incident in 1989, a strategy 
based on economic and academic cooperation aimed to reestablish the communication 
between the nations. Additionally, the strategy aimed to re-enable the close U.S. 
participation in the rapid economic development of China. (Shambaugh 2010.) 
 
Alongside with China’s development came perceptions of its intentions: the lack of 
transparency in Chinese actions contributed to the global uncertainty towards China. 
When mere engagement with the Chinese government did not advance governmental 
transparency, the U.S. aimed to integrate China into the international institutions. When 
integrated, China could apply to the international rules and norms, and contribute to 
global governance (Shambaugh 2010). Therefore, its actions would become more 
transparent. 
 
As a part of the integration strategy, the U.S. advocated China’s inclusion to the World 
Trade Organization in 2001. In the 21st century, the Chinese economy enjoyed rapid 
economic development. While China was proving its economic capabilities, the U.S. 
requested China to take on more global responsibilities. As a part of the integration 
strategy, the U.S., with the rest of the international community, hoped that integration to 
international organizations would gradually lead to political reforms in China and to the 
liberation of Chinese institutions, benefitting the Chinese society and the global 
economy. Nevertheless, China kept rising but did not integrate to the international 
system in the way the U.S. anticipated. 
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The lack of transparency behind China’s intentions accumulated the uncertainty in the 
Sino-U.S. relations, and when the strategy of integration seemed unsuccessful, the 
administration of George W. Bush (2001-2009) implemented an approach of strategic 
hedging. An important part of this strategy was to strengthen relationships with 
alliances and partners in Asia, surrounding China with a solid network of strategic and 
military cooperation. According to Shambaugh (2010), this strategy would apply 
pressure on China to comply with international norms and place the U.S. in a position of 
strength. 
 
By 2010 China had already replaced Japan as the second largest economy in the world 
after the U.S., creating more tension in the U.S.-China relations. The Obama 
administration (2009-2017) introduced a new approach towards Asia: the pivot. 
Regionally, this meant that the U.S. increased its presence in the area, contributing to 
the hedging strategy of the previous Bush Administration. However, the strategy 
showed signs of engagement: the U.S. emphasized the importance of cooperation with 
China and keeping the lines of communication open. Nevertheless, tensions were 
intensified by the U.S. accusing China of a theft of intellectual property and 
condemning its militarization at the South China Sea. (CFR 2020.) 
 
A driving force of the U.S. rebalance strategy (the pivot) was the strong American belief 
that the increased U.S. presence was welcomed in the Asia-Pacific. This might have 
been the case among U.S. allies and partners, but from China’s perspective the pivot 
was possibly alarming: the U.S. was moving closer to China’s borders. Nevertheless, 
this strategy of the Obama administration considerably strengthened the U.S. position in 
Asia. Simultaneously, China began to extend its own influence in economic and 
diplomatic domains, most notably with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a grand 
investment campaign to connect China closer to the west of Asia via new sea and train 
routes leading all the way to Europe and Africa.  
 
This rising assertiveness of China was noted by the Trump administration (2017-2021). 
(NSS 2017, IPSR 2019.) To answer the challenges of China’s rising power, the 
administration approached China from a competitive perspective, a strategy notably 
different from the predecessors’: the unpleasant reality of the strategic competition and 
the battle for regional (and eventually global) hegemony demanded readjustments in the 
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U.S. policies toward China. While abandoning the previous strategies of engaging and 
cooperating with China, the Trump administration promoted a strategy of 
disengagement. For example, initiating trade war by imposing tariffs on Chinese 
imports, restricting visa admissions for Chinese students and academics in specific 
technological fields, and controlling Chinese investments in the United States all 
contributed to disengaging from bilateral cooperation rather than engaging in it. China 
is seemingly responding reciprocally. 
 
However, despite the proclamations by the succeeding Trump administration, the 
previous engagement strategies have proven to be successful in some areas. For 
example, the Obama administration succeeded in the negotiations concerning Chinese-
led cyberattacks on intellectual property: they obtained a commitment from the Chinese 
government on a sensitive issue, and reportedly the amount of Chinese-led cyberattacks 
declined. (Bader 2018.) 
 
Nevertheless, the opinions of the Trump administration were clearly stated in the 
National Security Strategy of 2017: China is a revisionist power with an intention of 
replacing U.S. leadership in Asia-Pacific. (NSS 2017.) However, Shambaugh (2018) 
argues that Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from specific international 
organizations and agreements only intensified the shift of geostrategic power to China’s 
advantage. To answer the assertiveness of China, the U.S. requires a strategy which 
balances competition with peaceful coexistence. (Shambaugh 2018, 87.) However, to 
balance strategic competition of the global leadership position with a peaceful 
coexistence seems unlikely: the fierce battle for technological or economic superiority 
and the change in the diplomatic China discourse especially during the Trump 
administration, made it challenging to deepen the bilateral trust and cooperation.  
 
The Trump administration adopted an approach of ‘fundamental abandonment of 
largescale interaction and engagement, a change in the long-term foundation of the 
relationship being undertaken without serious public discussion of the costs and 
benefits, or of the risks and opportunities’ (Bader 2018). Therefore, the administration 
had, without thorough consultation, let the bilateral relationship deteriorate, and by 
disengaging, pursued a strategic competition in multiple domains instead. According to 
Bader (2018), the prevailing assumption within the administration was that 
disengagement from China automatically meant containing, isolating, and militarily 
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hedging China. Due to economic interdependence, however, a complete disengagement 
would have severe consequences on the American economy.  
 
To the end of the Trump administration disengagement prevailed as the dominant 
approach in the Sino-U.S. relations. For example, during the final months of his 
presidency, Trump conducted reports on how to approach China from a perspective of 
containment. From the documents of Trump administration observed for this thesis, it is 
evident that the U.S. under the Trump administration was driven by the notion of 
winning.  
 
For the Biden administration (2021-), the Trump administration left a bilateral relation 
so fractured and filled with distrust that it will be a challenge for the Biden 
administration to build a stable and prosperous relationship between China and the 
United States. Whether Biden, who acted as the Vice President for Barack Obama, will 
return to strategies implemented by the Obama administration or applying novel 
strategies to diminish the consequences of the hostile approaches pursued by the Trump 
administration, only time will tell.  
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2. Theoretical framework 
 
Today, U.S. and China are entangled in a comprehensive competitive relationship, 
extending to ‘the geostrategic, geoeconomics, geopolitical, military, cultural, scientific, 
technological, innovation, and many other domains’(Shambaugh 2018, 85). Shambaugh 
(2012) believes the U.S. and China are interlinked in a competitive cooperation – 
‘coopetition’, and despite the competition, the two superpowers must coexist. However, 
he argues that the competition is indirect, rather than direct: both nations conduct 
regional policies to pursue their own interests, rather than focus on countering one 
another. (Shambaugh 2018, 125.) Nevertheless, tensions rise as the secondary power 
challenges the primary power, and the possibility of a power transition intensifies the 
tensions in ‘coopetition’. 
 
The U.S.-China relationship can be conceptualized from the perspectives of different 
theories. These multiple frameworks observe the dynamics of the relationship, and 
according to Shambaugh (2012), not one of them can fully describe the complexity of it. 
He explicates the relationship through the principal international relations theories of 
realism and liberalism. These theories are diverse and have multiple approaches when 




From the realist perspective, the likes of John Mearsheimer believe that ultimately all 
nations seek power and are displeased with the current status quo. As an offensive 
realist, he argues that a conflict between China and the U.S. is inevitable, and therefore, 
as a preventive action, the U.S. should contain China’s rise. (Mearsheimer 2018.) 
Realists believe that conflicts are a natural consequence of a hegemonic struggle. Still, 
they argue that maintaining hegemony for the U.S. is, in fact, a status quo, while 
China’s pursue for hegemony is seemingly threatening. To meet the threatening 
challenge, according to the realist approach, the U.S., with its network of allies and 
partners in the region, should apply strategic hedging towards China, containing its rise. 
(Shambaugh 2012.) 
 
Mearsheimer (2014) argues that U.S. is the center of the unipolar international system, 
and other great powers, such as China and Russia, pose challenges to the U.S. 
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hegemony. In 2014, Mearsheimer believed that, in time, China would become a peer 
competitor, launching a global game of power politics. For the U.S. to efficiently 
respond to this rise, the administration required a strategy based on realism to meet the 
challenge. Mearsheimer (2014) further argues, that offensive realism, as an international 
relations theory, corresponds the current situation of great power politics: if China 
continues its rapid economic development, it will attempt regional hegemony. The U.S. 
will, however, try to prevent this, and likely will be supported by most of China’s 
regional neighbors, such as Japan, India, and Singapore. (Mearsheimer 2014, 4). This 
resembles the strategic hedging approach, and according to Mearsheimer (2014, 5), 
containing China’s rise with a network of alliances and partners will eventually lead to 
tremendous security tensions in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
Mearsheimer (2014, 6) argues, that every powerful nation seeks to maximize their 
power and gain regional leadership, while simultaneously controlling the rising attempts 
of other powerful nations. His theory of offensive realism is built upon five assumptions 
of the world that shape the behavior of nations; the international order is anarchic rather 
than hierarchical; all nations have offensive military capabilities; the impossibility of 
predicting a state’s intentions; survival is a nation’s primary goal; and nations will 
conduct their strategies accordingly to survive. Therefore, to survive, a nation much be 
able to obtain and project as much power as possible. According to the theory, when a 
nation is regionally powerful, its survival is protected. (Mearsheimer 2014, 6.) For 
example, the U.S. has established its regional hegemony in the Western hemisphere: no 
nation there has the power to challenge it. According to Mearsheimer, China pursues the 
same hegemonic position in Asia. (Mearsheimer 2014, 7.) 
 
According to the power transition theory (Organski & Kugler 1980, Friedmann 2011, 
He 2017), when a rising power reaches the capacity of the ruling power, the ruling 
power is expected to act. For example, Graham Allison believes that a conflict in the 
U.S-China relations is most certain. This conflict, that Allison calls the ‘Thucydides 
Trap’, is inevitable from a historical perspective: in the past 500 years, 16 times a rising 
power challenged the ruling power. From these, 12 ended in a war. (Allison 2019.) 
 
Amidst the rivalry, the parties are conflict-prone to outside tensions. According to 
Allison (2019), in the U.S.-China relations, especially Taiwan raises the potential of an 
unwanted military conflict. Taiwan is a primary interest for China, and the 
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independency attempts of Taiwan, and the U.S. support of it, could escalate to a conflict 
due to the uncertainty of the extend of China’s unification intentions. (Allison 2019.) 
For the past U.S. administrations, the Taiwan issue has been an asset in the bilateral 
relations. The U.S. presence in the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China Seas 
intensifies the bilateral tensions, reciprocally expanding China’s military expansion in 
the region. 
 
Despite the interference of a third party, there are other frictions in the bilateral relations 
that might spark a conflict. For example, China is constantly challenging the U.S. 
leadership in different domains. Initiated by the fear of being displaced by China in 
leading fields, the U.S. has revised its China strategies during the past administrations. 
For example, the Trump administration replaced the engagement and cooperation-
focused strategies of the Obama administration with a containment strategy, abandoning 
the ideas of common prosperity and placing America first. This strategy has required 
parallel actions from China, gradually accumulating tensions. 
 
According to offensive realism, containing a rising China is most effective and realistic 
defense strategy for the United States. (Mearsheimer 2014, 27.) Building strong 
regional networks and restraining the expansion of Chinese military and influence 
projection in Asia-Pacific, enable the U.S. to maintain its position of strength. 
Therefore, Mearsheimer argues, the United States, as an offshore balancer, needs to 
‘come onshore when the local powers cannot contain the potential hegemon by 
themselves’ and thus lead the containment efforts (Mearsheimer 2014, 27).  
 
Mearsheimer (2014, 27) introduces three approaches to the containment strategy: a 
strategy to prevent wars, a strategy to slow down Chinese economy, and a strategy of a 
rollback. The strategy of preventive war is not a viable option because of China’s 
nuclear deterrent: launching a war consequently leads to the possible usage of weapons 
of mass destruction. Neither would slowing down China’s economic rise prove an 
efficient containment strategy, because the economies of China and the U.S. are too 
intertwined: any containment would negatively impact the economy of the United States 
and its allies and partners. While the gradual economic slow-down would positively 
impact American security, it is not outweighed by the economic consequences. 
According to Mearsheimer, the third approach of a rollback strategy is the most realistic 
of the three. In the rollback strategy, the U.S. would approach pro-Beijing nations with 
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an intention of regime change to a more pro-American leader. (Mearsheimer 2014, 27-
29.) 
 
In 2014 Mearsheimer projected that if the security competition between U.S. and China 
were to intensify, conflicts are inevitable. He believes it to be unlikely for conflicts to 
lead to military confrontation, but conflicts of competitive nature are certain to occur. 
For example, building defense capabilities, conducting assertive national security 
strategies, creating threat perceptions, launching trade wars, and placing travel 
restrictions all contribute to the U.S.-China security competition. (Mearsheimer 2014, 
36-37.) 
 
As realists believe that nations ultimately seek power, security is an essential national 
policy. According to Vuori (2008, 66), the theory of securitization categorizes security 
issues as a special type of politics, which authorizes the application of special policies to 
ensure the security requirements of a nation are met. He believes that securitization can 
be used to legitimate political purposes in non-democratic political orders, such as 
China. (Vuori 2008, 66.)  He argues that securitization theory is often applied to 
democratic political systems, as it is assumed that, for example, totalitarian systems do 
not need the legitimization in their political actions the way a democratic system would. 
Therefore, as political leadership itself is already justified in a totalitarian system there 
is no need to legitimize moving special issues to security concerns. According to Vuori, 
the totalitarian leadership alone is not enough to justify political actions: the political 
system needs to practice persuasion and coercion to survive. The securitization theory 
identifies issues that threaten the security of the nation, more precisely, threatens the 
nation’s core values. (Vuori 2008, 68-69.) 
 
Maintaining security is a powerful political tool: politicians use security speeches as 
means of justifying political purposes, rather than providing information on the reason 
of the securitization. (Vuori 2008, 71.) Vuori argues, that a securitization functions as a 
‘complex illocutionary speech act’, meaning a multifaceted act of proclaiming and 
legitimating a security issue without the need of reasoning with the audience. Therefore, 
administrations use means of suggesting, requesting, declaring, or explaining why 
special issues have become national security issues. (Vuori 2008, 75-76.) The means of 
securitization are effective when the aim is to portray another nation as a national 
security threat. For example, the 2017 National Security Strategy of the Trump 
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administration functions as a means of portraying China as a national security threat. 
However, whether the accusations are based on real issues or on mere assumptions, is 
for to the audience to interpret.  
 
The threat perception targeted at China is not a new discourse in the United States. The 
‘China Threat’ theory has shaped the U.S. strategies towards China since the late 19th 
century. This theory has had several distinctions, like the “Yellow Peril” in the late 19th 
century West or the “Red China menace” in 1950s United States. While the discussion 
has fluctuated, in the turn of the 1990s, the threat discussion returned stronger alongside 
with the extensive economic and military expansion of China. In the 21st century, the 
threat perception has spread to issues, such as cyber security and environmental 
security. (Jin 2011, 270-271.) 
 
According to Buzan, in the policies of the U.S. administration, especially that of George 
W. Bush, there was a strong proposition to portray China as a strategic competitor, thus 
contribute to the ‘China Threat’ theory. He suggests, that if the succeeding 
administrations continue this discourse, it will be impossible for China to continue its 
rise in a peaceful manner. This realist approach suggests that the U.S. administrations 
are, in fact, threatened by China’s rise. Buzan believes China’s rise will eventually 
challenge the hegemonic position of the U.S. and the rules of the international system. 




While the core of realism lies in nations seeking hegemonic power and protecting their 
own security, the values of liberalism reflect moral values and ideas through domestic 
and civil policies, which contribute to the good of the societies. Rather than pursuing 
power, together the nations contribute to an international community built on common 
rules and norms. According to Shambaugh (2012), the liberal thought is built on the 
freedom of the individuals, free trade, and democracy. They believe that despite of 
competitive relationships, due to interdependency democratic nations do not fight wars 
with one another. Therefore, the theory of interdependency falls under the umbrella of 
liberalism. The likes of Joseph Nye (Nye & Keohane 1971) have argued that due to the 
economic interdependency, nations are less likely to avoid conflicts and build on 
cooperation. However, autocratic governments, which are not as accountable to the 
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society as democracies are, have a tendency for aggressive behavior. (Shambaugh 
2012.) 
 
Shambaugh (2012) explicates that there are three main aspects of the liberal theory in 
the U.S.-China relations: republican liberalism in the form of democracy, commercial 
liberalism in the form of free trade, and liberal institutionalism in the form of global 
governance. The liberal values of democracy (such as freedom and human rights), while 
resisted by the authoritarian Chinese Communist Party, have been the cornerstones of 
U.S-China debates for decades. The U.S. policies have advocated these values in their 
strategies towards China when applying the approaches of shaping or integration. The 
importance of free trade is centralized in the liberal theory, and integrating China to the 
international institutions, such as the WTO, would contribute to the common prosperity. 
The international norms adopted from such institutions were expected to gradually 
liberalize Chinese institutions from within. (Shambaugh 2012.) While the prevailing 
international order is liberal, with the United States as its spokesman, China has been 
expected to integrate to it. The likes of Ikenberry (2012) argue that China has an 
alternative motive. According to him, ultimately China aims to alter the existing 
international system with its own authoritarian ideologies and values, which generally 
oppose those of the liberal theory. (Ikenberry 2012.) 
 
The concerns of the liberal theories focus on the position of China, whether it will 
accept the status quo of the international system or take on a role of a revisionist state 
with an intention to alter the system to its favor. Alistair Iain Johnston (2003) argues 
that China, as a rising power, would naturally be interested in altering the international 
order more suitable for its objectives. However, the believes that the past Chinese 
diplomacy indicates that the China shows signs of status quo, but they are often 
overlooked by the challenging and revisionist China discourse that prevails. (Johnston 
2003, 6.) The American desire to shape the Chinese society and integrate it to the 
American values-based international system has been a core objective in the American 
China policy for decades. Therefore, the idea of China as a status quo state is ideal: 
China would remain less assertive and would not have the opportunity to threaten the 
United States. However, especially during the Trump administration, the discourse on 
China as a revisionist nation replaced the liberal aspirations of China’s status quo. 
According to Johnston, these notions of more realist dispositioning of China were 
prevailing also during the administration of George W. Bush (Johnston 2003, 7). 
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Whether China truly abandoned its status quo position, Johnston argues it was not quite 
so. For example, he believes that the Chinese government has not attempted to directly 
alter the rules of the international system. However, China has shown reluctance to 
accept some of these rules. Johnston further argues that while China has not directly 
embraced all the rules, it has scarcely introduced new ones. (Johnston 2003, 23.) 
 
Nevertheless, Johnston believes that China shows more signs of status quo: China is 
integrating to the international system. Even though reluctantly abiding to some of the 
rules, it is part of global trade. Johnston further argues that the Chinese government has 
not shown concrete evidence to revisionist actions, not by altering the liberal rules-
based international system or by replacing the U.S. hegemonic position. (Johnston 2003, 
49.)   
 
Yan Xuetong and Zhang Zhexin believe that the engagement and integration strategies 
of past administrations, and especially that of the Obama administration, have 
demanded reciprocal actions from China. For example, the rebalance strategy launched 
by the U.S. has compelled China to accommodate in its own way – by answering the 
challenge. Zhang (2019) argues that the further regional engagement, strategic hedging, 
and increased U.S. military presence in China’s ‘backyard’ have resulted in China 
taking initiative and enhancing its regional position. This, in turn, has increased China’s 
assertiveness in the eyes of the United States, contributing to the threat perception.  
 
According to Yan (2010, 263), the U.S. rebalance strategy and China’s reciprocal 
assertiveness contributes to a ‘theory of superficial friendship’ where both China and 
the U.S. are trying to maintain an illusion of cooperation. This illusion, supported by 
diplomatic courtesy, hides the bilateral disagreements on primary issues behind a 
curtain of collaboration in issues of less importance. For example, for China, two great 
contributors to this are the rising Chinese nationalism and its rapid economic 
development, that have made China bolder when it comes to maintaining Sino-U.S. 
relations. (Yan 2010, 263-265.) Seemingly, the U.S. rebalance strategy intents to answer 
these challenges which complicate the relationship. However, the Trump administration 
abandoned notions of liberalism and diplomatic courtesy. Instead, they met the China 
challenge from a competitive, realist perspective.  
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From the U.S. perspective, its strategies of shaping and integration contribute to China’s 
inclusion to the international system. Alongside with China’s integration to international 
organizations and its growing capabilities came expectations: China should participate 
in the sharing the burdens of global responsibilities carried by other great powers. 
 
“China’s Responsibility’ theory sparked in the 1990s, during the Clinton administration. 
The U.S. strategy towards China was engaging it to ensure its integration to the 
international system. Therefore, to be accepted as a member of the community, China 
needed to become a responsible actor. According to Jin (2011), the Clinton 
administration, however, lacked a strong China-policy, and the succeeding 
administration of George W. Bush applied a containment strategy towards China, which 
they perceived as a ‘strategic competitor’. Therefore, the threat perception seemingly 
prevailed over the need to make China an equal international contributor. However, 
during the second term of the Bush administration, the policy changed to ‘encouraging 
China to become a responsible ‘stakeholder’’, and to build a solid foundation of 
cooperation in the Sino-U.S. relations, pushing the threat perception to the background. 
The theory of ‘China’s Responsibility’ became an international China discourse (Jin 
2011, 272), and the question of the role of China as a status quo or a revisionist state 
became more relevant in the administrative discussions. 
 
The discussion in the 21st century focuses on the issues of the responsibility theory: the 
responsibility China carries does not commensurate with China’s capability. According 
to Jin (2011), the resistance in full integration on China’s behalf raises uncertainty 
whether China will integrate to the U.S.-led international system and adhere to the rules 
and norms of it. Therefore, the strategy behind the theory suggests that, via integration, 
the U.S. aims to shape China to fit the current international order, which promotes the 
U.S. values. (Jin 2011, 274.) 
 
The starting point of this thesis is that the international relations theories of realism and 
liberalism are reflected in the administrative discussions of the past U.S. 
administrations. The following chapters analyze U.S. administrative reports and notions 
with a purpose of finding correlations between the strategies the U.S. has applied 
towards China and how they discuss China from the perspective of international 
relations theories of realism and liberalism. This thesis focuses on the U.S. 
administrations of Barack Obama and Donald Trump. These two administrations and 
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their strategies and approaches differ notably: the Obama administration reflected 
notions of liberalism, while the Trump administration implemented strategies based on 
realism. Therefore, observing the U.S.-China relations and the changes in it during these 
two administrations offer interesting insights to how the relationship developed from 
publicly content and cooperative friendship to a hostile, strategic competition for 
leadership.  
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3. Data collection and methods 
 
The U.S.-China relations has been under close observation for decades. The past U.S. 
administrations have implemented strategies with aims of shaping, engaging, and 
integrating China to the U.S.-led international system. At times, the U.S. has altered its 
approach to containing China, and hedging it with a strong network of allies and 
partners.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze; how China is portrayed in specific U.S. national 
reports; what strategies Obama and Trump administrations have applied to China and 
how do they differ; how the strategies applied by these administrations reflect the 
international relations theories of realism and liberalism; observing the reasons behind 
the chosen theories; and whether these different theories form a threat perception or 
reflect diplomatic neutrality in the administrative documents. Both administrations 
acknowledged China’s rapid rise but had generally different approaches to 
accommodate its development. Therefore, the purpose of the analysis is to observe the 
changes in the tone of the China discourse, the reasons behind it, and their possible 
implications to the public perception of China. 
 
This thesis will analyze the U.S.-China relationship from the perspective of the United 
States and focus on how the official China discourse, as represented in the documents, 
has evolved since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1970s. The introduction 
will discuss the relationship in general, however, the main emphasis is on how the 
discussion has changed during the administrations of Barack Obama (2009-2017) and 
Donald J. Trump (2017-2021). The relationship will be analyzed through International 
Relations theories of realism and liberalism. These distinctive discourses have multiple 
sub-theories, such as the power transition theory, the China threat theory, or the theory 
of securitization. These theories reflect the strategies the U.S. administrations have 
applied to China, such as engagement, hedging, or containment.  
 
This thesis observes the China discussion in U.S. reports concerning national security, 
national defense, and the U.S. regional strategies for Asia. The analysis focuses on the 
reports by the administrations of Barack Obama and Donald J. Trump. Majority of the 
reports are conducted by the personnel of the Department of Defense; however, the 
analysis also includes notions from individual members of the administration. This is 
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due to the attempt to find similarly topical documents from both administrations, and 
for example, unlike the Trump administration, the Obama administration did not 
conduct a specific report of their strategies toward Asia-Pacific. Therefore, this thesis 
relied on remarks and articles from both the President and the Secretary of State, which 
introduced the Obama administration’s Asia policies. 
 
To interpretate the message conveyed in the administrative documents, a discourse 
analysis offers the necessary tools: it observes the content of the discourse, the usage of 
language, and how it is organized. (Gill 2000, 175.) For this thesis, a discourse analysis 
is used to observe how the two administrations use language in administrative 
documents to, for example, make accusations or portraying themselves and others. 
According to Johnstone (2017, 77), in political speeches discourse are often determined 
by the initial intention of the speaker and whether the purpose of the speech is met. This 
is closely linked to the language used. A discourse analysis helps to interpret the 
illocutionary actions taken in the written text, meaning, when observed in a context, 
what illocutionary speech acts take place, what is the intention of the text, and whether 
the intention is met? For example, using performative verbs (such as ‘I promise’ or ‘I 
order’) clearly indicates the intention of the text. However, avoiding performative verbs 
and being indirect about the illocutionary actions is considered a more polite approach 
to convey a message, because it leaves more room for interpretations by the audience.  
(Johnstone 2017, 78-79.) For the documents analyzed for this thesis, both direct and 
indirect illocutionary actions take place: there is a notable gradual transition from 
indirect illocutionary intentions during the Obama administration to direct intentions by 
the Trump administration. 
 
Therefore, a discourse analysis is suitable for this thesis, as the purpose is to observe 
how the China discourse has changed from liberalism towards more realist perspectives. 
Therefore, an analysis on the terminology and the deliberate and indeliberate 
perceptions created though specific connotations, and their relations to either liberalist 
or realist theories is essential. It helps to spot these observations and follow their 
development as well as their consequences. As the intention of this thesis is to create a 
vision of the prevailing China discourses during the Obama and Trump administrations, 
and how it has developed during their presidential terms, therefore, a discourse analysis 
is useful in observing how the notions of the theoretical framework are presented in the 
chosen administrative documents. 
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The analysis is divided into three chapters: National Security Strategies, National 
Defense Strategies, and Regional Strategies for Asia. These reports will be observed 
through the lens of international relations theories, more precisely realism and 
liberalism. While the spectrum of these prevailing international theories is vast, the 
analytical framework of this thesis focuses on theories complementing the engagement 
and containment strategies implemented by the U.S. administrations. This includes 
theories which discuss the threat perception and those supporting peaceful coexistence. 
  
The first chapter (4. National Security Strategy) discusses how China is presented in the 
light of U.S. national security. Both administrations conducted National Security 
Strategies: Obama published two (one for each term), and Trump published one. In 
addition, the Trump administration published an additional report directed at China: the 
U.S. Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China. These national security 
reports, and the strategic approach, which further implements the National Security 
Strategy of Trump administration concerning China, discuss how the actions of China 
are affecting the U.S. security and prosperity. The National Security Strategy was 
chosen for this thesis because the report discusses the threats and the current world 
order the U.S. perceives. Therefore, there reports (with the addition of the strategic 
approach) offer a good premise on how the U.S. observes the world, its own role in it, 
and whether revisionist powers are aiming to challenge the U.S. hegemonic position. 
 
The following chapter (5. National Defense Strategy) observes the defense strategies of 
the United States, and the U.S. preparedness to counter behavior which threatens its 
national security, prosperity, and values. While the Obama administration reflected 
rising challenges in its Defense Strategic Guidance and Quadrennial Defense Reviews, 
China was not as straightforwardly discussed. However, the Trump administration, in 
its summary of the classified National Defense Strategy, explicates in detail how 
China’s global assertiveness impacts the defense strategy of the Unites States. These 
reports were chosen for observation due to their nature: they detect the potential threats 
to the U.S. and the world and discuss means to defend the liberal international order 
from malign behavior.  
 
The third analysis chapter (6. Regional Strategies for Asia) discusses the U.S. regional 
approaches to Asia. These two administrations defined the region differently: the 
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Obama administration discusses the region of Asia-Pacific, while the Trump 
administration refers to Indo-Pacific, seemingly due to its intentions of including India 
to the region. For the region, the Obama administration lacked official regional strategic 
reports, therefore for the purpose of this thesis, a speech by President Barack Obama to 
the Australian Parliament was analyzed. In the remarks, the President introduces the 
‘rebalance strategy’. In addition, an article written by the Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton was observed, in which the rebalance strategy is explained in detail. These 
documents reflect how the U.S. perceived China, and what is its role in the strategy. The 
Trump administration published two reports concerning their strategies to Asia: Indo-
Pacific Strategic Report, and United States Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific. 
 
The final chapter discusses the differences in the administrative approaches towards 
China presented in the observed documents and how they reflect the notions of 
academic discussions introduced in the theoretical framework. The comparison focuses 
on the general findings of the reports; how China is portrayed in the documents; how 
the terminology and tone of the China discussion reflects the opinions of the 
administration; and how the strategies applied to China correlate with the international 
relations theories of realism and liberalism. The analysis is based on the author’s 




4. National Security Strategies 
  
The purpose of a National Security Strategy (NSS) report is to provide the outlines for 
the U.S. objectives and interests in both national and global scale and explain how they 
contribute to the national security. The NSS, which is conducted by the President and 
their administration, discusses ‘the United States’ international interests, commitments, 
objectives, and policies, along with defense capabilities necessary to deter threats and 
implement U.S. security plans’ (Office of the Secretary of Defense). The following 
chapter discusses the portrayal of China in these security strategies of both Obama and 
Trump administrations. The Obama administration published two NSS reports, one for 
each presidential term (2010, 2015), while the Trump administration published one NSS 
report (2017). In addition, the Trump administration conducted the United States 
Strategic Approach to The People’s Republic of China in May 2020, which further 
implements the approaches towards China presented in the 2017 NSS. 
 
The NSS reports by the two administrations differ greatly in their tones of discussion. 
However, the issues covered in these reports were generally the same. The main 
objectives are to expand U.S. presence in Asia and build a solid network of like-minded 
nations to promote American values of democracy and human rights. The future threats 
and challenges the complex and rapidly changing environment of the region were 
assessed in a similar manner, but only the Trump administration bluntly addresses the 
origins of such challenges (China).  
 
The Obama administration has a more diplomatic approach, and in both of its reports 
the discussion concerning security issues stayed optimistic and avoided direct 
accusation towards rivaling nations. Challenges were acknowledged, but the challengers 
remain ‘adversary’. The Trump administration, however, took a different approach. The 
2017 NSS emphasized the importance of transparency for the people of America to 
have a clear understanding of the challenges the U.S. faces home and abroad. While 
these challenges had not changed dramatically since the presidency of Obama, the 
narrative turned from diplomatic statements to provoking accusations. In the NSS of the 
Trump administration, the key concern was directly addressed: China was the 
challenging competitor, and with its revisionist ideologies it threatens the U.S. 
leadership in both regional and global context.  
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4.1 Obama administration 
 
During the Obama administration, the main strategy towards China shifted from a 
comprehensive engagement to a rebalancing strategy. In the engagement approach the 
focus was on welcoming and integrating China into the international community and 
sharing the benefits the inclusion offers. Reciprocally, the community was expecting 
China to reform its economic and political systems, contribute regionally, and share the 
global responsibilities. However, China kept developing on its own terms and was not 
molded into the liberal and democratic framework the U.S. had hoped for.  
 
This fear of China’s rising power forced the Obama administration to change its 
approach. With further investment of time, effort, money, and military presence in the 
region the U.S. formulated a new strategy: the rebalance to Asia. In it, the engagement 
approach was not abandoned, but was supported with the new pivoting strategy, 
allowing U.S. to further penetrate the Asia-Pacific region and establish stronger 
economic, political, and military presence there. The following chapter introduces the 
National Security Strategies of 2010 and 2015, and describes how China, as an 
emerging power, was positioned in the U.S. vision of the international order during the 
Obama administration.  
 
4.1.1 Comprehensive engagement strategy 
 
The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) was published one year after the 
presidential inauguration of Barack Obama. At the time, China had already replaced 
Japan as the second biggest economy in the world, being second only to the United 
States. This rise of China demanded a more comprehensive approach from the U.S in its 
foreign policy. However, despite China being on a consistent rise, the 2010 NSS does 
not directly reflect to the challenges it poses or articulate its strategic approaches. 
Focusing on constructive cooperation with nations worldwide, the document lacks a 
realistic approach towards future threats and instead reflects an opportunistic vision of 
the future. 
 
In 2010, the Obama administration had a clear approach: to accept and maintain rising 
global competition through comprehensive engagement. This meant active participation 
with the U.S. allies and friends in promoting its values in the fields of security, 
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prosperity, and democracy. The intention of such engagement was to find solutions to 
global issues, build stronger international organizations, and observe the intentions of 
closed regimes. As for those nations that did not share the American values, an 
emphasis was on building cooperation and mutual trust. This kind of a constructive 
cooperation was considered essential to regional security and prosperity. (NSS 2010, 8-
13.) In Asia, the U.S. focus was on constructing a reliable partnership with China. 
While the NSS acknowledged that China had become a center of influence, it 
emphasized the importance of pursuing an effective partnership based on cooperation 
on issues of global and regional concern. Because China was emerging as a strong 
regional power, it was also expected to participate in sharing more of the global 
responsibilities.  
 
In addition to its own engagement strategies, in the NSS the U.S. acknowledged that 
China had engagement attempts of its own: to expand its power and influence globally. 
However, as the administration pointed out, some emerging powers posed threats to 
security by not abiding to international rules, while others (the U.S. included) used their 
growing influence to build sustainable partnerships. (NSS 2010, 12-13.) While this 
statement was not directly aimed at China, the NSS strongly suggested that China could 
be considered as one of those reluctant, emerging nations.  
 
When it comes to the international order, the NSS acknowledged China’s growing 
influence, further emphasizing the importance of constructive cooperation. Instead of 
portraying China as an assertive nation that rapidly spreads its influence worldwide, 
U.S. approached the situation from a positive perspective: if the mutual respect between 
the two nations remained strong, China’s rise could raise opportunities for U.S. as well. 
A bilateral relationship was considered critical for reaching global objectives, and China 
was expected to assume the role that comes with its emergence – a role of greater 
responsibility in global affairs. (NSS 2010, 42.) 
 
When further discussing the approaches the U.S. has concerning China, there is a clear 
division between embracing a China that contributes to the international community and 
plays by the Western values, and condemning a China that disrupts the international 
order by pursuing its own objectives. In the NSS, the U.S. encouraged China to make 
choices that contributed to the common peace, security, and prosperity. However, the 
administration was prepared to monitor the growing military modernization of China 
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and act accordingly to any possible hostilities. Thus, building a constructive cooperation 
was necessary to reduce the risk of misunderstandings. Nevertheless, U.S. 
acknowledged that these two nations would not agree on every issue yet stated that 
cooperation should not come at the expense of compromising the American values. 
(NSS 2010, 41-43.) 
 
Overall, this NSS was not a direct attack towards China nor its actions. The emphasis 
was on building a constructive cooperation between the two nations. The discussion 
concerning China consisted of rather positive notions of China’s further integration to 
the international community, and acknowledgements of its growing influence and 
power. The tone remained reflective, rather than provocative.  
 
Throughout the NSS, the discussion concerning China was surprisingly passive. The 
Obama administration did not directly accuse China of transgressions, nor did it address 
China in any sensitive topic, like human rights issues. When such issues were discussed, 
however, the blame was on the unnamed, ‘hostile’, ‘repressive’, or ‘adversarial’ nations 
or on governments that restricted their citizens from accessing information. So, whether 
these issues were addressed towards China, that decision was left to be made by the 
readers themselves.  
 
The liberal notions of the theoretical framework were strongly reflected in the report: 
China was expected to contribute to the common prosperity by supporting free trade and 
by integrating to the international community, which shared liberal values. While realist 
perceptions of China’s intentions and military actions caused concerns, the main tone of 
the report was to cherish the opportunities strong bilateral trust offered. 
 
4.1.2 Rebalancing to Asia 
 
In 2015, the U.S. had further developed its engagement strategy in Asia-Pacific. The 
rebalance to Asia, or ‘the pivot’, meant a strategic commitment to the region, and a 
deeper devotion of time, resources, and presence in there. Even though the rebalancing 
strategy reshaped the engagement to Asia-Pacific, the discourse concerning China 
remained similar with that of the 2010 NSS.  
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Globally, the U.S. refocused its vision towards Asia-Pacific from the instabilities of the 
Middle East. This meant more bilateral agreements and further integrating to regional 
multilateral institutions and strengthening the solid base that already existed. China had 
continued its consistent rise to a regional power, now spreading its influence worldwide. 
Therefore, in the 2015 NSS, further integration – and more importantly, more 
responsibilities – were expected of China. Aspiring tensions are acknowledged in the 
report, but any disagreements are concealed under the illusion of a constructive, 
strategic partnership.  
 
The second National Security Strategy report of the Obama administration emphasized 
rebalancing Asia, meaning a formation of deeper relations and presence in the region, 
rather than engaging it from afar. The existing relationship with China was described as 
‘unprecedented’ and special credit to China was given on the successful cooperation 
with the U.S. in global climate issues. However, the assertive actions of China in the 
Asia-Pacific region were not neglected, as the U.S. vowed to continue to monitor the 
military modernization and the tensions China caused in the South China Sea. (NSS 
2015.) Still, the focus of the 2015 NSS was on cooperation, and China’s rise was 
embraced with open arms. However, this was to be on the terms of the United States: 
aspiring China was welcomed, but only if it played by the rules of the international 
community. (NSS 2015.) 
 
More was expected of China as its capabilities grew mightier. However, the NSS 
implied that China did not contribute enough to the international community or share 
global responsibilities, like other powerful nations did. (NSS 2015, 4.) While China was 
expanding its power regionally, the NSS had a focus point on the bilateral instability: 
China’s rapid expansion and the uncertainly of its intentions, for example with its 
military modernization. The lack of transparency behind the behavior of China stirred 
the stability in the South China Sea, where territorial disputes occurred between China 
and the ASEAN nations. While this was acknowledged in the report, the NSS did not 
directly accuse China of conducting any malign actions in the region. However, the 
NSS condemned (in general) all irresponsible and aggressive behavior, attacks, and 
coercion, while encouraged and supported open dialogue and peaceful resolution of the 
dispute. (NSS 2015, 13.)  
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As for promoting and defending the U.S. values, such as human rights, freedom of 
speech, or democracy, the NSS acknowledged that ‘repressive’ and ‘adversarial’ nations 
did not abide to the international rules, which support these liberal values. While these 
nations were not identified, listed challenges, such as citizens’ restriction of accessible 
information, censorship, denying political opposition, and corruption could all be 
applied to China. (NSS 2015, 20-21.)  
 
In general, the sources of hostility were not articulated in the report, but there were 
linkages between China and assertiveness, for example, when discussing the ‘rise of 
China’ in the NSS, it was often categorized or associated with the ‘aggression of 
Russia’. (NSS 2015, 4). This portrayed China as an aggressive nation as well, and this 
association reflected a negative tone over China’s economic development. While the 
direct general discussion concerning China remained passive or cooperation-focused, 
the NSS did acknowledge aggressiveness in Chinese behavior: for example, the U.S. 
declared to continue to deter and defend the American intellectual property against any 
cyberattacks initiated by the Chinese government. (NSS 2015, 24). This was the only 
direct articulation of aggressive or threatening behavior from China mentioned in the 
NSS reports by the Obama administration, indicating the securitization was not an 
essential part of the liberal approaches of the United States. 
 
While in the 2010 NSS, the U.S. was more optimistic that China would contribute to the 
global responsibilities and fulfill the requirements above, it is evident that in the 2015 
NSS the U.S. was not as optimistic anymore. The rebalancing strategy and further 
strengthening regional alliances with nations surrounding China implied that the U.S. 
was placing more pressure on China to comply with the international rules and share 
global responsibilities. Seemingly, while the U.S. intention was not to contain China, it 
was to note that when China is showing reluctance to comply with the international 
norms, China distanced itself from the international community. In addition, the 
discussions of forming a ‘partnership’ with China had been abandoned: in the 2015 
NSS, the Sino-U.S. relations were referred to as ‘constructive cooperation’. (NSS 2015, 
24.) The administration recognized that competition was inevitable in this new form of 
relationship, and seemingly the U.S. aimed to manage this competition with a mixture 
of engaging, rebalancing, and hedging China strategically.  
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In the 2015 NSS, the overall tone of discussion concerning China continued the 
reflective patterns of the previous report. By reflecting similar notions of liberalism as 
the previous NSS, the report focused on the positive aspects of China’s rise, rather than 
the challenges it posed. However, the report showed more traits or realist approaches 
than the predecessor: China was considered as a rising, challenging power with unclear 
intentions. However, the overall attitude towards China remained rather passive and 
optimistic: instead of challenging the international order, China would adjust to its role 
as a rising power and contribute to global responsibilities accordingly. Nevertheless, the 
Obama administration was seemingly increasing its deterrence towards assertive 
Chinese actions, for example in cyber security issues. Nevertheless, the 2015 NSS was 
not a transparent strategic approach. Rather, it reflected the regional and global 
instabilities and the U.S. preparedness to overcome them, without revealing the motives 
behind the objectives.  
 
4.2 Trump administration 
 
The engagement and rebalancing efforts of the Obama administration were abandoned 
shortly after the presidential inauguration of Donald J. Trump. Seemingly, China’s 
economic and technological advancement demanded a revision of the U.S. strategic 
approach to meet the competition. In the NSS, the Trump administration pointed out 
that ‘[…] these competitions require the United States to rethink its policies of the past 
two decades - policies based on the assumption that engagement with rivals and their 
inclusion in international institutions and global commerce would turn them into benign 
actors and trustworthy partners. For the most part, this premise turned out to be false’ 
(NSS 2017, 2-3).   
 
According to the 2017 NSS, the previous administrations failed to effectively respond to 
the long-term objectives of China. Therefore, the Trump administration conducted a 
more concise strategy to deter and defeat the hegemonic attempts of China in Indo-
Pacific. The approach towards China changed from constructive cooperation to a 
consistent competition in all domains.  
 
The Trump administration published an additional document entitled the ‘U.S. Strategic 
Approach to The People’s Republic of China’ (2020) to further implement the National 
Security Strategy. The strategic approach discusses the challenges China poses to the 
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U.S. national security objectives of protecting the American people, prosperity, values, 
and security, and how the U.S. was prepared to counter China’s hegemonic challenge. 
 
 
4.2.1 Competitive approach 
 
The 2017 National Security Strategy by the Trump administration recognized the 
competitive nature of the current global affairs. The rising interdependence between 
nations, and especially the dependence towards China, was altering the U.S.-led 
international order. Gradually, the U.S. had been losing its competitive edge in multiple 
fields, while China had modernized its capabilities, now challenging the U.S. leadership 
in all domains. Therefore, to meet the China-challenge, the Trump administration 
conduced its 2107 NSS, basing it on ‘principled realism’. The constructive cooperation 
and engagement attempt of previous administrations were replaced with a strategic 
competitive approach. (The White House 2017.) From the perspective of the NSS, this 
meant addressing the bilateral relations and the assertiveness of China as they were 
seen: a threat to the U.S. hegemonic position. 
 
According to the Trump administration NSS, China, alongside with Russia, was 
challenging America and its influential position in the world. These rival powers were 
harming the collective security and prosperity by making economies less free and fair, 
modernizing their military capacities without proclaiming their intentions, and 
repressing their own peoples. In addition, the rival powers were discrediting democratic 
values with propaganda and spreading false news, which were forming a gap between 
the U.S. and its allies and partners. (NSS 2017.) Such aggressive and hostile behavior 
demanded the U.S. to maintain its leadership to secure global stability and defend it 
from malign and disruptive intentions. (NSS 2017, 2-3.)  
 
According to the administration, because of the openness and transparency it promotes, 
the U.S. had lost its competitive edge, and adversarial powers had taken advantage of 
this situation. For example, they exploited infrastructure, interfered in political 
processes, and threatened the stability and prosperity of the United States. (NSS 2017, 
7.) Additionally, China had participated in stealing intellectual property and conducting 
malicious cyber activities to gain competitive advantage and weaken American 
businesses (NSS 2017, 21). The liberalist notions of openness and transparency of the 
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Obama administration were seemingly denounced by the Trump administration, and the 
blame for the loss of a competitive edge was placed on Obama and the preceding  
administrations. A more realist approach of strategic competition was conducted to 
match the (assumed) Chinese intentions. 
 
Concerned by the economic competition, the Trump administration stated that it would 
‘no longer turn a blind eye to violations, cheating, or economic aggression’ and 
embraced nations that did the necessary reforms in their economies and politics and 
expanded their liberal economic trading systems (NSS 2017, 17-20). As for the 
competitiveness of China, according to the NSS, it challenged the U.S. economically, 
and aimed to restrict its access and operations regionally. Working patiently, contently, 
and discretely, China was trying to change the international order in its favor. Therefore, 
the U.S. declared its preparedness to meet this challenge by deterring, coercing, and 
constraining adversaries, supported by a vast network of like-minded nations. (NSS 
2017, 26-28.) 
 
As for promoting American values abroad, the U.S. was prepared to expose malicious 
Chinese activities, such as repressing free societies and spreading misinformation and 
propaganda. The U.S. has increased its preparedness to counter any possible ideological 
threat China posed to the international community. (NSS 2017, 35.) However, to 
maintain stability and liberal international order, the U.S. needed to rely on the like-
minded nations in the Asia-Pacific to work together. 
 
The U.S. took pride in its worldwide coalitions and pointed out that none of their 
adversaries had the same. Therefore, the U.S. focused on building positive relationships 
with aspiring partners worldwide to counter China’s spreading ideologies that contradict 
those of the liberal world. According to the NSS, the administration acknowledged that, 
for example in Africa and Central Asia, China had presented itself as a more tempting 
partner through its investment campaigns. The U.S., on the other hand, has a value-
based approach. Unlike China, which aimed to take advantage of other nations with its 
unfair agreements, the U.S. wished to help these nations, for example with advancing 




As for placing this containment strategy in a regional context, from the U.S. 
perspective, China was rapidly expanding its power worldwide. It had gradually 
advanced its influence in every region of the world. In this context, in the NSS, China 
was portrayed as a malign rising power, which intended to replace the U.S. leadership 
and threatens the regional and global security. According to the NSS, China has been 
placing heavier influence in regions of Indo-Pacific, Europe, and Africa, leaving the 
U.S. calling out for its allies and partners to resist the spread of its authoritarian trends, 
radical ideologies, and aggression, and to fight against unfavorable shifts of regional 
power. (NSS 2017, 45.) The NSS thoroughly discussed the challenges China poses in 
all parts of the world. 
 
In the Indo-Pacific region, there was a competition between free and repressive world 
orders. (NSS 2017.) Like in Obama’s NSS reports, the 2017 NSS welcomed a 
cooperative relationship with China. However, the report argued that China was taking 
advantage of the kindness of the U.S. and the international community. China was 
accused of using ‘economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and imply 
military threats’ China aimed to ‘heed its political and security agenda’ (NSS 2017, 46). 
In addition, China was engaged in a geopolitical competition: its actions in the South 
China Sea were condemned by the U.S. as endangering and undermining regional 
stability with an attempt to limit U.S. access to the region. Thus, the U.S. leadership in 
the region was necessary, legitimated even, as they promoted order, sovereignty, and 
independence, rather than spread deterrence and oppression. Therefore, the U.S. would 
continue to increase its presence in the region in order to contain China’s assertiveness. 
(NSS 2017, 46-47.) 
 
Also in Europe, China was expanding its strategic goals and unfair trade practices. The 
NSS vowed to contain these attempts and restrict China’s acquisition of sensitive 
technology. The U.S. called for unity in international organizations based in Europe to 
contain these malign actions. Similarly, in the Western hemisphere, the Chinese 
influence was intensifying through state-led investments and loans. Additionally, the 
extension of its power has been supported with ideological intentions. For example, the 
report argued that China was supporting the dictatorship in Venezuela and seeking to 
expand its military linkages in the region, thus openly opposing democratic values of 
the U.S. and its partners. (NSS 2017, 48-51.) 
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In South and Central Asia, the U.S. aimed to restrict China’s influence by helping 
nations maintain their sovereignty and resist domination. Additionally, the U.S. was 
asking for resistance in Africa as well. There, China was expanding its economic and 
military presence, undermining the regional development by corrupting elites and 
dominating extractive industries. (NSS 2017, 50-52.) 
 
Using the analytical framework of this thesis, it is clear that the National Security 
Strategy by the Trump administration emphasized its focus on realism. They abandoned 
the diplomatic and cooperative-focused strategies of the predecessors and addressed to 
global challenges as they were seen from a realist perspective: a rising China formed a 
competitive threat to the United States regional and global leadership. While the 
purpose of a NSS is to articulate possible challenges that undermine the security and 
prosperity of the United States, the 2017 NSS was therefore a direct declaration of 
China as a threat in all possible domains. 
 
The dramatic articulation leaves no room for misinterpretations. China was considered 
as a malign, aggressive, and assertive nation with an ambition to reshape the 
international order according to its ideologies, control and manipulate the economic 
system in its advantage, and eventually replace the U.S. in its hegemonic position in 
Asia-Pacific, and eventually globally. So far, this competitive and realist approach from 
China has brought uncertainty and instability in global affairs, but the U.S. remained 
confident that history will repeat itself and America would win. (NSS 2017, 28.)  
 
4.3 United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of 
China 
 
The U.S. Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China published in 2020 by 
the United States Department of Defense worked in accordance with the National 
Security Strategy by the Trump administration. As the 2017 NSS clearly addressed, 
despite reflecting on all the challenges the U.S. faced worldwide, the main challenger 
was China. This strategic approach further implemented the China policy of the United 
States. It was an acknowledgement of the strategic competition between the two 
superpowers, and a transparent action plan for the U.S. to maintain its regional and 
global leadership, to promote its values, and, as the strategy argued, to defend its nation 
as well as its allies and partners from the malign and aggressive behavior of China. 
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Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in late 1970s, China has gone through 
successful reforms that has led to rapid economic development. However, according to 
the document, China did not develop in its economic and political opening in the way 
the U.S. had expected and hoped for. Instead, China took advantage of the free and open 
societies around, gradually forcing upon and reshaping the international order according 
to the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). (U.S. Strategic Approach to the 
People’s Republic of China 2020.) This behavior violated the values the U.S. promotes 
and the norms of the international system. Therefore, the U.S., led by the Trump 
administration, has shifted from the engagement strategy of its predecessors towards a 
competitive approach to counter this malign Chinese behavior, demanding more 
transparency in its actions. Despite of its accusive tone, the report was a competitive 
strategy based on principled realism, seeking constructive and cooperative engagement 
with China. (U.S. Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China 2020.) 
 
The document discussed the U.S.-China relations from the perspective of protecting the 
four principles discussed in the NSS: protecting the American people, advancing 
American prosperity, spreading American influence globally, and maintaining peace 
home and abroad. The strategic approach addresses to the challenges the assertive China 
poses in three main fields: economy, liberal values, and security. The report articulates 
the necessary measures the U.S. needed to take to increase its preparedness to defend its 
global position. 
 
The report argued that the Chinese trade practices were considered protectionist and 
harmful. Due to the global dependence on Chinese exports, China had gained a position 
where it could exploit international organizations and other nations to comply to its 
demands. Its actions were described as ‘unreasonable’ and ‘discriminatory’, and its 
restrictions exploit the global markets to its own advantage. This, according to the 
report, worked for the benefit of the CCP, and spread its ideologies and influence by 
pressuring nations into cooperation or agreements. Especially the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) has been labeled by the U.S. as a Chinese attempt to control larger 
regional spheres through unfair agreements, pressure, and extortion. (U.S. Strategic 
Approach to the People’s Republic of China 2020, 2-3.)  
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When it comes to China challenging the U.S. values of life and liberty, the message was 
similar with that of the National Security Strategy: China has entangled itself in a war of 
ideologies with the United States. Through malign behavior China has been turning its 
citizens and other nations against the beliefs and norms promoted by the U.S., 
threatening the security and economic prosperity of other nations. For example, 
academic freedom, a major ideological difference in bilateral relations, has been 
threatened by China. The report declared that the aggressiveness of China violates not 
only the academic freedom of its own people but threatened the integrity of the 
American research. Additionally, the report emphasized the proportion of propaganda 
the CCP spreads through its campaigns and initiatives, such as the BRI. (U.S. Strategic 
Approach to the People’s Republic of China 2020, 4-6.) 
 
In security issues, China seemingly has been continuing its military activities in the 
Asia-Pacific, especially in the South China Sea, to spread its influence and strategic 
objectives. For example, alongside with the BRI, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
has been expanding its presence globally. Because of the lack of transparency in 
Chinese actions, they were interpreted in the document as threatening to the security 
interests of the United States. (U.S. Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of 
China 2020.) In addition to the tensions China caused with its military modernization, 
the document discussed China’s objectives in the field of information technology, 
where it aimed for leadership using malign and unfair tactics. For example, the PRC 
National Cyber Security Law required global companies, such as Huawei and ZTE, to 
reveal information to the CCP for its own strategic purposes, thus violating the U.S.-
China bilateral agreements. (U.S. Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China 
2020, 6.) 
 
The Trump administration’s approach to China was clear: the U.S. would not tolerate 
China’s malign and threatening actions, its aggressive and coercive behavior, nor its 
unfair and oppressive treatment of peoples and nations. (U.S. Strategic Approach to the 
People’s Republic of China 2020.) The report acknowledged that the past 
administrations’ attempts of cooperation and engagement with China have not been 
successful, making China an unsuccessful global contributor in the international 
community. China continuously has attempted to discredit democracy, spread false 
propaganda and contradicting ideologies, and oppose the U.S.-promoted values. Thus, 
the report argued that China aimed to replace the hegemonic position of the U.S. and 
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gradually separate the U.S. from its allies and partners. (U.S. Strategic Approach to the 
People’s Republic of China 2020, 7.) 
 
According to the report, the U.S. has responded to these actions through ‘principled 
realism’ (U.S. Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China 2020): the U.S. 
acknowledged the strategic competition between the two nations and is prepared to 
respond accordingly to the global competition while defending its values. This did not 
mean trying to exclude China from regional and global organizations, but creating 
awareness of its actions and intentions, so other nations can resist its unfair practices 
and demand for openness and reciprocity. For the U.S. this meant protecting its 
interests, defending its institutions, and challenging China’s attempts to reshape the 
world in its favor. (U.S. Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China 2020, 8-
9.)  
 
Seemingly, the focus of the document was to encircle China with stronger alliances and 
partnerships, rather than including it to the community. While cooperation and 
engagement were considered as an important part of the U.S.-China relations, they were 
exclusively discussed from the perspective of advancing the interests of the United 
States, emphasizing less on the shared advances, unless they benefit the regional or 
global community. 
 
The rest of the document detailed the implementation of the strategic approach in 
accordance with the 2017 National Security Strategy. It had been acknowledged that 
this strategic approach to China was necessary, as the NSS was most directly targeted at 
China. This indicated the level of transparency the Trump administration was 
portraying, especially in contradiction to the transparency of the actions of China. The 
implementation section was a detailed description on how China was challenging the 
U.S. in its four main principles (1. Protect the American people, the Homeland, and the 
American way of life 2. Promote American prosperity 3. Preserve peace through 
strength 4. Advance American influence) from the perspective of national economic, 
political, and security policies. 
 
In the first principle concerning the national security of the United States (Protect the 
American people, the Homeland, and the American way of life) the U.S. looked for 
means to counter the propaganda and false information spread by the Chinese 
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Communist Party, for example, through proper education and the support of academic 
freedom, nationally and globally. In addition to demanding transparency, the U.S. 
expected more reciprocity from Chinese officials and investors operating in the United 
States to prevent its malign intentions. The U.S. also searched for counteractions for 
Chinese espionage targeted at the American citizens, enterprises, and educational 
institutions. According to the document, the CCP collected information to support its 
own military modernization and gaining an economic advantage in different industries. 
(U.S. Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China 2020, 9-11.) 
 
When it comes to the second principle of promoting American prosperity and protecting 
American enterprises, the U.S. had been taking measures to counter the unfair trade 
practices promoted by China by placing higher tariffs and restrictions reciprocally 
towards Chinese goods. Together with its allies and partners, the U.S. kept promoting 
an economic environment build on sovereignty, free markets, and sustainable 
development. (U.S. Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China 2020, 12-13.) 
 
The third principle (Preserve peace through strength) was linked to the 2018 National 
Defense Strategy (chapter 5.2.1. Summary of the National Defense Strategy), which 
introduced the actions the U.S. was implementing within the nation to match the 
challenges China poses. These included counteractions such as the modernization of 
U.S. technological defense capabilities, strengthening alliances, and ensuring the 
freedom of navigation. (U.S. Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China 
2020, 13.) Alliances and partnerships were a vital part of maintaining the U.S. 
hegemony. Like discussed in the 2017 NSS by the Trump administration, the network 
of like-minded nations the U.S. had acquired was something that China did not possess. 
Thus, an important part of preserving peace was to maintain strong networks globally. 
However, this included building a reliable relationship with China as well. The aim of 
the bilateral relationship here was to strengthen cooperation and communication to 
prevent conflicts, still reflecting notions of American liberalism. (U.S. Strategic 
Approach to the People’s Republic of China 2020, 14). 
 
The fourth and final principle (Advance American influence) emphasized the values 
promoted by the United States, which were the foundation of a well-functioning 
regional and global world order. To maintain the U.S. hegemony and the international 
values and norms, the chapter introduced approaches for the U.S. to counter malign 
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Chinese activities, such as authoritarianism, censorship, human rights violations, and 
unfair trade practices. (U.S. Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China 2020, 
14-15.) 
 
The main theme in the U.S. Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China was 
the juxtaposition between the U.S. and China and their ideologies, with the U.S. 
portrayed as the hero, while China was the villain. The ‘us’ and ‘them’ positioning in 
the document suggested an U.S. approach of regional division between the U.S. allies 
and partners and China. China was portrayed as a malign and aggressive actor, with the 
intention of exploiting others for its own advantage. Therefore, the illocutionary actions 
in the document clearly aim to emphasize the threat that China poses to the U.S. 
national security, contributing to the China threat theory.  
 
The terminology concerning China and its actions remained provocative and accusive. 
In its strategies, the Trump administration abandoned the diplomatic courtesy and 
careful addressing of China used by the Obama administration and supported its 
approach with direct and colorful exclamation of the current world order. However, 
while doing so, the document stayed loyal to the intentions of the administration: to 
reflect realism and transparency.  
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  5. National Defense Strategies 
 
The following chapter introduces the national defense strategies of the Obama and 
Trump administrations. These documents are based on the corresponding National 
Security Strategies of said administrations reflecting the objectives, challenges, and 
opportunities the U.S. faces in the changing complex environment. 
 
The Department of Defense of the Obama administration published two types of 
documents reflecting the U.S. defense strategies: the Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR) and the Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG). The QDR reflects the National 
Security Strategy from the perspective of national defense capabilities. For example, it 
describes the preparedness of the U.S. military forces, how the military supports and 
promotes the U.S. values abroad, and how the U.S. prepares for future challenges. The 
Obama administration conducted two QDRs (2010 and 2014). The DSG is a detailed 
projection to the future challenges. It was published in 2012, and the purpose of the 
document is to function as a diplomatic guidance for the Obama administration, as well 
as for the following administrations, on how to maintain the U.S.-led international 
order, promote universal values, and build cooperative networks. The documents 
portrayed an optimistic view of the future and China’s role in it.  
 
During the presidency of Donald J. Trump, the Quadrennial Defense Review was 
replaced by a National Defense Strategy (NDS). The official NDS is classified, but in 
the sake of promoting administrative transparency, the Department of Defense 
published a synopsis for the public. While the synopsis is not a detailed defense 
strategy, it does convey the main U.S. objectives, concerns, and approaches to meet the 
challenges of the complex world. Based on realism, the document bluntly addressed 
China as a number one security concern for the United States. 
 
5.1 Obama administration 
 
The Obama administration’s national defense strategies went through major shifts 
during Obama’s presidency. The first Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2010 was 
of a nation at war. The conflicts in the Middle East targeted the QDR’s focus to the 
region, offering a vague perception of the challenges elsewhere. However, the Defense 
Strategic Guidance (DSG) of 2012 projected the challenges and opportunities the U.S. 
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faced in the rapidly changing world, emphasizing the preparedness of the U.S. military 
forces to defend the liberal international system from countering ideologies and 
aggressive actors. Finally, the QDR of 2014 articulated the rebalancing and engagement 
strategy to Asia-Pacific, which had risen as a priority alongside the conflicts in the 
Middle East. 
 
The role of China in the national defense documents experienced a gradual shift in its 
importance. Its rise was acknowledged already in the QDR 2010, but its actual threat 
assessment was not articulated. The same theme continued throughout the two 
documents, with a gradual recognition of the extension of China’s military might and of 
the uncertainty of its intentions.  
 
5.1.1 Defense Strategic Guidance 
 
The Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) of 2012 entitled “Sustaining U.S. Global 
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense” introduced the strategy of the U.S. 
military development for the coming decade. The guidance implemented the strategic 
interests and defense priorities presented in the 2010 National Security Strategy by the 
Obama Administration. The objective was to protect the security, prosperity, and the 
human dignity by assessing global challenges and threats together with like-minded 
nations, while ensuring the continuation of the liberal international order. To maintain 
the U.S. influential leadership and superiority, and to reach the objectives, investments 
on developing the U.S. technological preparedness, such as the intelligence, 
surveillance, and the cyber capabilities of the U.S. military force, were considered 
essential.  
 
The DSG presented the reshaped global security priorities after a decade of war in the 
Middle East and implemented an engagement strategy to the region of Asia-Pacific. 
This guidance was created to function as an action plan to meet the future challenges 
until 2020, and to guide the administrative decision-making concerning military 
priorities. However, the presented objectives and plans of actions were to be achieved 
through more sustainable approaches: the reduction of the defense budget was 
seemingly the core purpose of the document, rather than the objectives themselves. As 
the DSG aimed to work as a guideline to reduce the U.S. military spending of the Joint 
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Force remarkably by 2020, the goal of this strategic guidance was to indicate the areas 
of priority for spending reductions without risking the national security capabilities. 
 
In addition to discussing the instabilities in the Middle East, the document declared the 
importance of the rebalance towards Asia-Pacific for the sake of sustaining global 
security. While the existing alliances and partnerships have formed a solid foundation 
for common security and prosperity, the U.S. acknowledged the importance of other 
networks, such as cooperation with China. 
 
As a part of the rebalance strategy, and to maintain U.S. global influence, the U.S. must 
strengthen its military presence and capabilities in the Asia-Pacific. The economic drive 
in the region brings forth opportunities for the U.S., but the rise of regional competition 
could challenge the security and eventually the prosperity of nations. During the 
following decades, China was expected to challenge the U.S. regional position and gain 
opportunities of challenge the international order. To meet the underlying regional 
challenges, the document highlighted the importance of ‘building a cooperative bilateral 
relationship’ with China for the sake of ‘peace and stability in East Asia’ (DSG 2012, 
2). According to the DSG, the military modernization of China, and the lack of 
transparency in its actions, had alarmed the region, and had to be accompanied with a 
reciprocal military presence of the United States to ensure the application of 
international laws, peace, and freedom of access. (DSG 2012, 2).  
 
As for the economic challenges the region faces, adversaries (both state and non-state) 
were posing challenges to shared values and norms, and have the ability for espionage 
and cyberattacks, threatening the prosperity and security of not only U.S., but of its 
allies and partners as well. Additionally, these anonymous adversaries were opposing 
norms and promoting anti-access. However, like typical in a document during the 
Obama administration, adversary actors were not directly addressed (an exception on 
terrorist organizations) but only described by their actions. For example, in the 
document, adversaries conduct cyber espionage and attacks on the United States but are 
left anonymous. (DSG 2012, 3).  This contradicts the transparency attempts of the U.S. 




In the DSG, the U.S. Joint Force rebalanced its approaches to meet the challenges posed 
by these anonymous adversaries. The document introduced approaches to meet 
objectives vital to the succession of stable homeland security and prosperity, such as 
countering terrorism and aggression, operating freely in anti-access areas and in 
cyberspace, and promoting liberty and human rights. The strategies were implemented 
in accordance with the 2012 National Security Strategy, with an aim to protect the 
interests of the United States. The action plans vaguely described the sources of the 
global challenges, making the strategies themselves seem equally vague. Nevertheless, 
the U.S. was prepared to ‘deny any aggressor the prospect of achieving his objectives’ 
(DSG 2012, 4). 
 
As for projecting power in areas with threats of limited access, the document stated that 
‘sophisticated adversaries will use asymmetric capabilities […] to complicate our 
operational calculus’ (DSG 2012, 4). The DSG continued to declare that symmetric 
means, such as cyber warfare or ballistic missiles, were obtained by nations such as 
China and Iran to match those of the U.S. (DSG 2012, 4). These actions were to 
challenge or to restrict the U.S. access and free operation in the region. 
 
The concerns towards China’s actions were not directly portrayed in the document. 
However, the potential of China rising to become a regional power was directly 
articulated twice. Firstly, the challenges related to China’s rise were acknowledged in 
association with the importance of building well-functioning relations with China to 
reduce the risk of misunderstandings. Secondly, the concerns behind China’s military 
modernization and the usage of symmetric means (anti-access) were discussed. 
 
Despite of its developments and acknowledged potentials of Sino-U.S. relations, the 
relationship itself was vaguely discussed. The emphasis was on building a cooperative 
relationship, especially at the time of shifts in the geopolitical environment of the 
region. China’s rise was acknowledged, as were the potential threats it could pose to the 
security and prosperity of the United States. Therefore, the document emphasize that the 
Joint Force would be prepared to deter and defeat the aggression of any potential 
adversary at any given location. Regionally, the gradually rising challenge was 
acknowledged, as the DSG emphasized the geographical shift of the U.S. interest from 
the Middle East to Asia-Pacific. 
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When it comes to describing the bilateral relationship, the words concerning China were 
seemingly chosen carefully, without the intention of provocation. For example, the DSG 
emphasized on the importance of building a cooperative relationship for the sake of 
regional prosperity. However, the U.S. Department of Defense recognized that, in the 
future, China’s rise to regional power had the “potential to affect the U.S. economy and 
our security in a variety of ways” (DSG 2012, 2) and that the military modernization of 
China needed more transparency to avoid future conflicts in the region. However, the 
report did not further elaborate how China could affect the U.S. economy and security, 
not positively nor negatively. Therefore, due to the lack of further elaboration in the 
documents, such declarations can be interpreted either way.  
 
The emphasis of the DSG was on the U.S. objectives in the Asia-Pacific region, rather 
than on its relationship with China, nor on the consequences of its rise to a regional 
power. Despite being referred to as one of ‘sophisticated adversaries [that] will continue 
to pursue asymmetric means to counter our power projection capabilities […]’ (DSG 
2012, 4), the DSG discussed China in a passive tone throughout the rest of the 
document.  
 
When it comes to the terminology used, the Defense Strategic Guidance followed the 
same diplomatic patterns of the National Security Strategies of the Obama 
administration. Threats and challenges were approached from a vague perspective, 
carefully avoiding direct blame or accusation. In the DSG, the issues and their sources 
were not directly discussed, except for cases which were internationally known, like the 
nuclear proliferation of North Korea or the conflicts in the Middle East. However, it is 
important to remember that while this document discussed the U.S. defense objectives, 
the DSG was seemingly constructed to primarily to function as a guidance on how to 
allocate the defense budget of the U.S. concerning the priority security concerns and 
projections of the future. Here, China and its actions were not considered a high priority 
threat. 
5.1.2 Quadrennial Defense Review 
 
The purpose of a Quadrennial Defense Review is to reflect the national defense strategy 
of the United States. The strategy includes, for example, the description of national and 
global challenges that poses threats the national defense, a development strategy for the 
military forces, and an assessment of future challenges. The reviews are formed in 
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accordance with the National Security Strategy, which identifies the challenges and 
opportunities the United States is facing. 
 
The Department of Defense of the Obama administration conducted two Quadrennial 
Defense Reviews. The QDR of 2010 focused on prevailing wars in the Middle East and 
recognizing rising regional powers, while the QDR of 2014 was a strategy for 
preparation to meet future challenges, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
The Quadrennial Defense Review of 2010 identified four strategic objectives for the 
United States:  prevailing wars, deterring conflicts, defeating adversaries, and enhancing 
forces. In addition, it articulated the necessary actions the U.S. needed to take to 
maintain its leadership in the international system in the future. (QDR 2010, 2-3.) The 
review assessed the primary security concerns to the Middle East, more precisely to the 
development of a combat-credible military forces to win wars sustainably and 
effectively. It was conducted based on the 2008 National Defense Strategy of the Bush 
administration, reflecting approaches necessary to protecting the national security 
priorities and projections. (QDR 2010, 1.) 
 
The main strategic objective of the 2010 QDR were in the Middle East. Additionally, 
the report showed concerns to the gradually changing international system, which was 
drifting away from the system the U.S. helped to build, a system based on U.S. values. 
Therefore, the U.S. needed to further engage likeminded nations to contribute to the 
common security and prosperity. (QDR 2010, iii.) 
 
The 2010 QDR discussed China’s rise to a regional power and addressed the concerns 
in the lack of transparency behind the Chinese military modernization. According to the 
document, the long-term intentions of China were seemingly to shape the international 
system with its political, economic, and military actions. However, China was not 
considered as a threat to the hegemonic position of the United States. The U.S. reflected 
confidence that it would ‘remain the most powerful actor’ and to do so ‘it must 
increasingly cooperate with key allies and partners to build and sustain peace and 
security’ (QDR 2010, 7). However, the review acknowledged the uncertainty in China’s 
integration to the international community. Therefore, the U.S. needed to develop its 
long-term preparedness to meet the changing geopolitical trends that aimed to change 
the prevailing international system. (QDR 2010, 7.) A change would be harmful to the 
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international community, and especially to the United States as the core of the network 
sustaining it. 
 
To deter and defeat threats posed by potential adversaries, the U.S. needed to strengthen 
its power projection worldwide. Especially the expansion of regional anti-access 
environments posed threats to the common security and prosperity. According to the 
QDR, the adversaries’ anti-access strategies aimed to restrict other countries from 
entering specific regions and operate there. Additionally, these aggressive strategies 
often violate international laws. As for China, its massive military modernization, and 
the lack of transparency in its actions have the potential to threaten the regional security. 
(QDR 2010, 31.) In long-term, these actions could create anti-access environments in 
the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
While the QDR recognized the looming presence of China affecting the regional and 
global stability with its own security and economic interests, the U.S. stayed true to its 
liberal values and welcomed a China that was willing to share the international 
responsibilities. With its growing might, China was expected to participate in the 
constructive contribution and burden sharing in international affairs. However, the lack 
of transparency in its political, economic, and military actions were casting a veil of 
mistrust over China’s intentions, affecting regional stability. Nevertheless, the U.S. was 
willing to build a cooperative relationship with China on issues of mutual interest and 
strengthening communication channels to reduce conflicts brought by 
misunderstandings. (QDR 2010, 60.) 
 
In the following 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the security priorities shifted from 
the Middle East to advancing American influence and leadership globally. New 
strategic challenges required rebalancing the U.S. Joint Force and stronger regional 
engaging to ensure strong networks of cooperation to meet the potential conflicts that 
could threaten the security and prosperity of the international order. Maintaining the 
U.S. leadership was vital to sustain the international order that promotes the U.S. values 
of peace, prosperity, and opportunity.  
 
The QDR was consistent with the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the 2010 
National Security Strategy, reflecting the approaches of the Department of Defense in 
the rapidly changing security environments. These approaches included rebalancing to 
50/91 
the Asia-Pacific and maintaining there an environment that reflected the U.S. interests. 
Together with allies and partners, the U.S. would deter and defeat adversaries, build on 
regional stability, and project its power to regions where its assistance was most needed. 
(QDR 2014, v.) To defend the international system from attacks, the U.S. increased its 
preparedness to counter those challengers ‘who could employ advanced warfighting 
capabilities while simultaneously attempting to deny U.S. forces the advantage they 
currently enjoy’ (QDR 2014, vii). Therefore, the 2014 QDR introduced approaches 
necessary for the U.S. to maintain its leadership regionally and globally. 
 
Protecting the stability of the Asia-Pacific region, its economy, politics, and security, 
has been a concern of the U.S. for more than a century. The economic development of 
nations has led to a systematic military modernization in the region, which in turn has 
created tensions and disputes. To contain the disruptive competition the QDR 
emphasized the importance of multilateral security organizations and agreements to 
prevent conflicts spurred by misunderstandings. Especially China was pin-pointed in the 
QDR. Like in the 2010 QDR, the main concern was the massive military modernization, 
and the lack of transparency in the intentions behind China’s actions. (QDR 2014, 4.) 
Additionally, China was seen to ‘continue seeking to counter U.S. strengths using anti-
access and area-denial (A2/AD) approaches and by employing other new cyber and 
space control technologies’ while achieving ‘air defenses that can restrict access and 
freedom of maneuver in waters and airspace beyond territorial limits’ (QDR 2014, 6-7). 
Restrictions of access challenged the U.S. regional presence, gradually threatening its 
ability to maintain its hegemonic position. 
 
Thus, the Department of Defense continued to implement the rebalance strategy towards 
Asia-Pacific. Further engaging the U.S. in regional organizations and strengthening 
bilateral relations helped the U.S. to secure and maintain a stable and free environment: 
an environment prepared to deter and defeat conflicts that threaten common security and 
prosperity. (QDR 2014.) Hence, the U.S. was strengthening its military presence in the 
region, as well as its bilateral and multilateral military dialogues. With China and the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Department of Defense aimed to build a 
relationship based on constructive cooperation. However, the QDR recognized the 
competitive nature of the U.S.-China relations and aimed to approach it with means that 
promote the international norms and values. (QDR 2014, 17.) An effective dialogue has 
the potential to reduce misunderstandings and helped to build mutual trust between the 
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two regional powers, and eventually facilitate discussions concerning regional security 
challenges, such as the nuclear proliferation of North Korea. 
 
In both Quadrennial Defense Reviews the discussion concerning China remained 
diplomatic, carefully worded, and optimistic. This cautious approach was familiar from 
other official administrative documents of the Obama administration. Generally, the 
discussion remained the same in both QDRs, with recognition shown to China’s rise 
and uncertainty towards its intentions. In neither document was China described as an 
eminent threat to the United States. However, in the 2014 QDR, it was acknowledged 
that China could become a potential threat in the future if it were to continue its military 
modernization and if its leaders continued refusing to show transparency in their 
decision-making. 
 
The 2010 QDR recognized China as a regional power but was not entirely concerned 
that its rise would threaten the U.S. hegemony in Asia-Pacific. While there were 
concerns towards China’s actions, the focus of the bilateral relations was emphasized on 
building cooperation between the two nations. Four years later, in the 2014 QDR, the 
strategic approach was fully targeted at Asia-Pacific, where China was described as a 
force looking for ways to counter the U.S. actions in the region.  
 
While its long-term intentions remained uncertain, China was seen as a more concrete 
challenge to the United States than before, through for example A2/AD restrictions. 
However, the importance of diplomatic and military cooperation between the United 
States and China was described as an essential part of the rebalancing strategy in both 
QDRs. This approach reflected optimism in the nature of the relationship: China was 
not necessarily challenging the hegemonic rule of the region but could become an equal 
contributor in maintaining the stability in Asia-Pacific. Nevertheless, the changes in the 
region were noted by the U.S., as rebalancing the engagement strategy to the region 
became a priority action in 2014 QDR. Simultaneously, the discussion concerning 
China changed its tone from recognition to a more cautious perception of its actions and 
its long-term intentions. However, the terminology used in both QDRs did not reflect a 
picture of a too concerned U.S. nor of a truly malign and evil China. 
 
Nevertheless, the lack of transparency in China’s actions and the military modernization 
were discussed on several occasions in both QDRs. The mistrust caused by this 
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behavior was acknowledged to potentially be a threat to the security and prosperity of 
the region and of the United States. There were no specific action plans discussed in the 
review towards thew actions of China, as the strategic approaches were discussed in a 
more general level and were not targeted at a specific state or non-state actors, unless 
when discussing terrorist organizations, the wars in the Middle East, or the nuclear 
threats of North Korea.  
 
5.2 Trump administration 
 
The Trump administration conducted a National Defense Strategy (NDS) in 2018 as an 
alternative to the Quadrennial Defense Review. While the official document is 
classified, the Department of Defense published a summary of the strategy, which 
articulated the global challenges and the preparedness of the U.S. Joint Force in 
deterring and defeating aggression. 
 
While the Obama administration had a diplomatic approach in their documents, the 
Trump administration based its strategy on realism: the U.S. was once again seen to be 
at war. Only this time it was a war of strategic competition and the main challenger in 
all domains was China. The NDS seemingly functioned as a defense strategy in 
countering China’s malign and aggressive actions, while defending the Indo-Pacific 
region from China’s hegemonic attempts.  
 
5.2.1 Summary of the National Defense Strategy 
 
The 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) is an official, yet classified, document 
stating the strategic defense objectives of the United States under the leadership of 
Trump administration. The NDS replaced the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 
previous administrations. Presented by the then Secretary of  Defense James N. Mattis, 
the NDS works in accordance with the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS), 
observing the threats the changing security environment poses from the perspective of 
national defense capabilities. 
 
The unclassified synopsis of the National Defense Strategy of 2018, entitled 
‘Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge’, introduced the strategic 
approach of the United States to protect the nation from the global instabilities. This 
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meant the development of a competitive military force (the U.S. Joint Force) to deter 
and defeat foreign aggression. The global strategic competition that was gradually 
challenging the international order, and the eroding U.S. leadership in it, had forced the 
Department of Defense to reshape its priorities from its predecessors. (NDS 2018, 1.) 
Instead of combating terrorism, the focus was now on defeating the strategic 
competitors and eliminating their threats. Following this logic, the NDS introduced 
approaches to deter China’s ‘predatory economics’, Russia’s border violations, and 
North Korea’s ‘outlaw actions and reckless rhetoric’ (NDS 2018, 1).  
 
For the U.S. to gain a competitive advantage and maintain its influential leadership 
required effective development of its military forces, as well as strengthening of its 
regional networks of allies and partners. Seemingly, maintaining its position was vital 
for the prosperity and national security of not only the U.S. but of other nations as well, 
and losing the competitive advantage would lead to radical changes in the international 
rules-based system and the economic freedom of nations. Thus, developing the 
preparedness and resiliency of the Joint Force helped keeping the U.S. geopolitically in 
a position of strength. (NDS 2018, 1.) 
 
The threat was eminent, as was stated in a brief concerning the NDS by Deputy 
Assistant of Defense for Strategy and Force Development Elbridge A. Colby. 
(Garamone 2018.) It stated that the erosion in military advantage with China would 
eventually lead to the decline of the U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific region, and later 
globally. Additionally, the shifts in regional hegemony would be harmful to the 
alliances and partnerships in the region. Thus, the NDS articulated the approaches 
necessary to achieve an advantage in the competitive nature of global affairs. However, 
Colby clarified that the summary was not a confrontation of threats, but a declaration of 
the reality of the situation. (Garamone 2018). 
 
The NDS declared China and Russia to be the main concerns in the strategic 
environment of the United States. Like discussed in a previous chapter concerning the 
2017 NSS, these two revisionist nations had forced a strategic competition, which 
challenged the current international system with their ‘authoritarian model – gaining 
veto authority over other nation’s economic, diplomatic, and security decisions’ (NDS 
2018, 2).  
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More specifically, China exploited the goodwill of international organizations with an 
aim to shape them to fit its purposes. With its military modernization, China intimidated 
its neighbors and threatened their sovereignty. In its predatory economics, China used 
malign and unfair practices to maximize its economic might and the economic 
interdependence of other nations. While failing to provide the necessary transparency of 
its actions, China continued to intimidate the allies and partners of the U.S. in the Indo-
Pacific region. (NDS 2018.) According to the NDS, the long-term goal of China was to 
replace the U.S. in its influential, economic, and military positions in the Indo-Pacific 
region with its own hegemonic objectives. Ultimately, its aim was to replace the U.S. 
leadership in a global scale. Additionally, these revisionist powers spread ideologies 
that violated the liberal values which were essential in securing the freely operating 
international community. (NDS 2018, 2.) 
 
In the NDS, the U.S. acknowledged its deteriorating superiority across domains. While 
a decade ago the U.S. could control the conflict areas, now the competition over 
superiority had breached the borders of the United States, threatening the security of the 
American citizens. (NDS 2018, 3.) This contributes to the theory of securitization, with 
the U.S. positioning China and its actions as a threat to the U.S. national security. For 
example, in the NDS, cyber security violations by the adversaries were described as a 
threat to the privacy of individuals and the technologies of the American enterprises. 
The U.S. needed to develop its preparedness to deter technological aggression, protect 
itself against intellectual theft, and through innovation create a defense that would win 
the wars of the future. (NDS 2018, 3.) 
 
The objectives of the Department of Defense were to ‘defend the homeland, remain the 
preeminent military power in the world, ensure the balances of power remain in our 
favor, and advance an international order that is most conducive to our security and 
prosperity’ (NDS 2018, 4). Maintaining these objectives required a clear-eyed 
assessment of China’s actions and a preparation for the challenges it posed today, as 
well as for the threats of its future actions, as it kept expanding its power and influence 
globally. Among the defense approaches were not only means vital for the U.S. national 
defense but means to protect its allies and partners worldwide from the malign and 
aggressive behavior of China. Strengthening alliances and partnerships would help to 
maintain the power balance, and the liberal values and norms promoted by the United 
States as prevailing ideologies of the international system. (NDS 2018, 4.) These values 
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were openly opposed by the revisionist powers and replaced with values repressive to 
sovereignty, security, prosperity, and human rights. 
 
Entering this strategic competition required the U.S. to strengthen its national power in 
all domains. This meant not only its military and economic might, but its diplomacy and 
intelligence too. Nevertheless, due to the existing strength of the nation and according to 
the document, the U.S. could easily challenge its competitors. (NDS 2018, 4.)  
 
According to the Department of Defense, this NDS, like the 2017 NSS, differed notably 
from its predecessors’ strategies. Given the current complexity of the nature of the 
competitive rivalry, the U.S. needed to reshape its approaches to meet the challenges 
posed by the long-term strategic competitors. (NDS 2018, 5.) However, competition did 
not need to lead to conflicts. Despite the threatening demeanor and aggressive behavior 
of China, the U.S. was offering opportunities for constructive cooperation on issues 
advancing the American interests. Should conflict occur, the U.S. had its combat-
credible forces, which are supported by vast networks of likeminded nations. Together 
with these networks, the U.S. would counterattack the coercion caused by the Chinese 
malign actions, such as economic exploitation, corruption, propaganda, and political 
and military intimidations. (NDS 2018, 5.) 
 
The NDS was a transparent and direct document stating the reality of the situation: the 
U.S. is losing its competitive edge. China has been gaining on (and surpassing) the U.S. 
in multiple fields. The document provided approaches to restoring the U.S. leadership, 
while ultimately hindering China’s hegemonic ambitions, and showing no tolerance 
towards challengers of leadership.  
 
The terminology associated to the threat of China’s rise is blunt, provocative, and 
accusive. The NDS articulated the actions and ambitions of China from a realistic and 
transparent perception. Instead of directing the blame on anonymous adversaries, the 
document (like the other documents by the Trump administration analyzed for this 
thesis) presented the world as they saw it. The discussion concerning China was 
generally negative throughout the NDS. Thus, the U.S. objective (far-searching, 
nevertheless) to build solid military relations and spark cooperation with China seems 
contradictory to the message the NDS was conveying. 
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In the synopsis, China was discussed from a perspective based on realism: the document 
assessed the threats China posed to the U.S. national security and prosperity and 
discussed the reasons accordingly. Despite the document provided being a summary of 
the classified National Defense Strategy, it openly articulated China to be the primary 
security concern. The discussion involving China had a provoking and accusing tone, 
repetitively describing China as a threat, a challenger, and a competitor with its 
aggressive and repressive actions. China was pictured as the common enemy of the 
liberal world order, not just an enemy to the United States. The NDS addressed China’s 
actions, especially in the South China Sea, to be something all nations should be wary 
of. 
 
The threat assessment was direct: China, as a ‘strategic competitor’ which continues ‘to 
pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony 
[…] and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence’ while 
‘undermining the international order from within the system by exploiting its benefits’ 
(NDS 2018, 2). Seemingly, the document functioned as an appeal to the alliances and 
partners of the U.S. to resist and contain the Chinese efforts to reshape the international 
system in its favor. 
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6. Regional Strategies for Asia 
 
Both the Obama administration and the following Trump administration made 
commitments to do more in Asia. While Obama’s approach was the ‘Rebalance to Asia’ 
(the Pivot), which meant contributing more time, effort, and money necessary to 
maintain the U.S. engagement in the region, the Trump administration’s vision of Free 
and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy made engagement in the region U.S. top priority, 
emphasizing on cooperation with its allies and partners to deter the assertiveness of 
China. 
 
These strategies shared similarities: a common goal of maintaining the U.S. presence 
and hegemonic position in the region, while strengthening alliances and forming new 
partnerships. However, the actual approaches varied. The core objectives of the Obama 
administration were to establish a solid U.S. foothold in Asia-Pacific-based 
organizations and strongly integrate U.S. to them; building on U.S. regional military 
presence; and strengthening alliances and partnerships to form a solid foundation for 
regional prosperity, stability, and openness. The Trump administration’s key focus in 
the region was to strengthen alliances and partnerships, while advancing and 
maintaining competitiveness in all domains. Seemingly, the U.S. agenda for the region 
was clear; to prevent China from spreading its influence and gaining a competitive 
edge; to counter Chinese propaganda by openly discussing China’s malign actions; 
appealing to other nations not to settle for its unfair agreements; and to resist Chinese 
ideology which violates international rules and norms. To hinder China’s rise and to 
protect the American prosperity, the Trump administration launched campaigns, such as 
the Trade War.   
 
The Obama approach was objective and cautious. It acknowledged the competitive 
nature of U.S.-China relations yet avoided public and direct discussion on issues where 
opinions differed. The Trump administration, however, openly addressed to the issues 
and challenges they interpreted from Chinese actions. The tone was accusive and 






6.1 Obama administration 
 
As of 2011, the Obama administration conducted multiple announcements concerning 
the refocus of U.S. engagement from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region. This 
indicated a rising interest in the growing economic and diplomatic spheres in the region, 
and the attempt of the U.S. to further integrate its role in them. Increasing the U.S. 
influence in the region would help to maintain the U.S. regional leading position and 
promote the universal norms and rules in Asia-Pacific.  
 
The U.S. has been engaging in the region for decades, but during the Obama 
administration’s ‘rebalancing’ or ‘pivoting’ strategy more concise actions took place. 
The administration did not publish an official strategic approach to Asia-Pacific. For 
that reason, this chapter discusses an article written by the State Secretary Hillary 
Clinton in 2011 published in the Foreign Policy, and the remarks of President Barack 
Obama to the Australian Parliament published a couple months later.  
 
6.1.1 Clinton’s article for the Foreign Policy 
 
An article for the Foreign Policy by the then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (October 
11) articulated the need for diplomatic, economic, and strategic engagement in the Asia-
Pacific to maintain the U.S. leadership position in a region where emerging powers, 
such as China, reside. Throughout decades the U.S. had helped to build the region’s 
security and prosperity, and now it was time to re-align U.S. interests from the Middle 
East back to Asia-Pacific. Maintaining the leadership meant protecting and advancing 
U.S. prosperity, for example securing the freedom of commerce and navigation via sea 
lanes to ensure access to markets. Therefore, ‘the pivot’ was launched. (Clinton 2011). 
To ensure regional leadership, an effective regional engagement strategy was required. 
 
This strategy reflected the American commitment to counter future security challenges 
of the region in six key objectives: strengthening alliances, cooperation with China, 
engaging with regional institutions, advancing trade and investment, expanding military 
presence, and promoting democracy and human rights. (Clinton 2011.) 
 
Further engaging in bilateral security alliances contributed to the regional capability to 
counter aggressive behavior from states and prepare for future challenges. As for 
59/91 
emerging regional powers, such as China, the U.S. approach aimed to advance these 
nations’ integration to the open and rules-based international order to ensure regional 
stability. The relationship with China was ‘one of the most challenging and 
consequential bilateral relationships the United States has ever had to manage’ (Clinton 
2011). The U.S. strategy towards China was built upon a ‘careful, steady, dynamic’ 
approach (Clinton 2011), with an emphasis on building on issues of mutual interest. 
 
The article acknowledged the contradiction in U.S.-China relations, with some 
Americans interpreting China’s rise as a threat to the U.S. national security and 
prosperity, while some Chinese saw the American engagement in the region as a 
containment attempt of China’s prosperous visions. Clinton rejected both of these 
approaches, proclaiming that the prosperities of both nations were closely intertwined 
and equally important for the development of one another. (Clinton 2011). Thus, a 
constructive cooperation was required to effectively handle the emergence of China and 
to put its regional potential to good use. Potentially, this could reduce the hostile 
perception of China and boost global cooperation.  
 
To share global responsibilities and obligations between regional powers, the bilateral 
communication channels needed to ‘translate positive words into effective cooperation’ 
(Clinton 2011), meaning that both nations needed to work on transparent 
communication to eliminate threats of miscommunications that could escalate into 
conflict. This meant an open discussion identifying where both nations’ interest met, 
and where they collided. As certain disagreements were to rise, the U.S. declared 
willingness to address them ‘firmly and decisively […] to avoid unrealistic 
expectations’ (Clinton 2011). A foundation of a solid relationship, whether based on 
cooperation or competition, determined the future of the region. Thus, further 
integrating China into the international organizations and maintaining an open dialogue 
built on multilateral trust and contributed to working together to overcome regional 
challenges. 
 
To reduce the risk of regional conflicts, the U.S. sought an effective military 
cooperation with China. China’s extensive military modernization had the international 
community wary of the intentions behind its actions. Therefore, in the attempts to 
strengthen bilateral relations, the U.S. focused on the transparency of communication to 
clearly articulate the U.S. interest in the region, reciprocally expecting China to 
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‘overcome its reluctance’ and ‘work together […] to discuss sensitive issues like 
maritime security and cybersecurity’ (Clinton 2011). 
 
To ensure the continuing economic prosperity in Asia-Pacific, China needed to 
cooperate with the U.S. in maintaining an open and free commerce in the region. It was 
of national interest of the United States to demand fair business opportunities in China 
and fair competitiveness in the region. This demanded China to make serious economic 
reforms to ‘end unfair discrimination against U.S. and other foreign companies’, ‘end 
measures that disadvantage or appropriate foreign intellectual property’ and ‘allow its 
currency to appreciate more rapidly’ (Clinton 2011). Working towards reforms and 
restricting unfair competitiveness would benefit all the nations in the region. 
 
Human rights violations in China have been a major concern for the United States. The 
U.S. has advocated for those detained or disappeared in China for speaking up or 
opposing the government, in accordance with the international laws promoted by the 
United States. A more transparent Chinese political system would increase not only the 
trust of the citizens of China, but of the international community. According to Clinton 
(2011), ‘China is placing unnecessary limitations on its own development’ when not 
abiding to the international rules and norms. Thus, the U.S. continued to promote its 
core values of democracy and human rights to encourage nations towards political 
reforms. 
 
Clinton’s depiction of U.S.-China relations was by far the most descriptive, realistic, 
and transparent of the Obama administration’s publications reviewed for this thesis. The 
article by Clinton was a direct approach to meet the challenges the dynamic region of 
Asia-Pacific projected, and especially that of the assertive China. It depicted the 
bilateral relations from the perspective of both cooperation and competition, 
emphasizing the importance of working together to overcome regional and global 
security challenges. The liberal notions of cooperation and the inclusion to the 
international community prevailed in the article. China was expected, or at least hoped, 
to integrate and accommodate to the liberal values the international community 
promoted. 
 
Despite of confronting China in areas of disagreement, the article maintained a 
diplomatic and respectful tone: it did not make direct accusations, aim to isolate China 
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from the international community, or project a threatful image of China. It did, 
however, stress the numerous ways in which China did not play by the international 
rules and norms. Instead of focusing on the harmful consequences China’s actions have 
on other nations, including the U.S., the article emphasized that China was only 
harming its own development by undermining common agreements and manipulating 
outcomes. Nevertheless, the focus of the China discussion was on building a solid 
cooperation based on clear and direct communication.  
 
6.1.2 Obama’s remarks to the Australian Parliament 
 
In his remarks to the Australian Parliament in 2011, President Obama stated the U.S 
agenda to the region as an effort to ‘advance security, prosperity and human dignity 
across the Asia-Pacific’ (Obama 2011). Preparing to meet the future opportunities and 
challenges the region provided, the U.S. continued to strengthen its regional leadership, 
which had helped building the region to the prosperous center it was. The U.S. had 
contributed to and fought for the economic and democratic changes the regional nations 
had gone through, and ‘will never allow it to be reversed’ (Obama 2011). The attention 
to the region was considered necessary for the protection of American people and 
prosperity, especially due to the nuclear threats the region poses. 
 
Promoting the U.S. values and strengthening the alliances and partnerships acted as the 
priority approach of the strategy. Rebalancing the region, according to the remarks of 
the President, meant ensuring regional security. The international order the U.S. 
promoted in the region contributed to the stability and prosperity of all nations: the 
international laws protect the human rights, and freedom of commerce and navigation. 
(Obama 2011.) Together with like-minded nations, strengthening these values and 
norms contributed to maintaining the security of Asia-Pacific. 
 
The remarks revealed Asia-Pacific becoming the focus of the U.S. strategic interests. 
Closely linked to the national security and defense strategies, the rebalancing strategy 
demanded an increase of the U.S. military presence in the region. While in the position 
of the regional hegemon, the U.S. considered itself strong enough to deter aggression 
and defend itself and its allies from military threats of adversaries. Modernizing military 
capabilities and increasing its presence in Asia-Pacific reflected the U.S. drive to 
maintain its leadership position and deterrence against those who challenged it. 
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According to Obama, in the relationship with China, the U.S. emphasized the 
importance of effective cooperation. China’s economic prosperity would serve the 
interest of many nations, the U.S. included. Thus, a peaceful rise was welcomed. The 
U.S. acknowledged that China’s increasing influence has had positive impacts to the 
region, for example, in reducing nuclear tensions in the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, to 
manage regional stability and reduce the risk of misunderstandings, the U.S. wished to 
strengthen the communication networks in Sino-U.S. relations. Nevertheless, the U.S. 
protected firmly international rules and norms it promoted, and ‘candidly’ addressed 
Beijing with ‘importance of upholding’ these values and ‘respecting the universal 
human rights of the Chinese people’ (Obama 2011). 
 
The economic prosperity of the region relied on the openness and transparency of 
markets. Thus, the U.S. advanced transparent and fair trade agreements with regional 
nations. To ensure the region’s economic prosperity to be fair, sustainable, and in a 
continuing growth, the U.S. emphasized the importance of following international rules 
and norms. For the United States, a fair economic environment deterred the thefts of 
intellectual or technological property, eliminates corruption, defends human rights, 
demands democracy, and fights against climate change. (Obama 2011.) The remarks 
articulated the importance of democracy in economic prosperity. Democratic 
movements ‘have succeeded […] in Asia’, while ‘other models have […] failed – 
fascism and communism […] have failed for the same simple reason: They ignore the 
ultimate source of power and legitimacy – the will of the people’ (Obama 2011). 
 
The remarks acknowledged that the region had been separated by differing ideologies 
and political opinions, but nevertheless declared democracy to be most prevailing form 
of government. In addition, the U.S. declared to support civil societies all around Asia-
Pacific for demanding transparency and accountability from their governments and 
defending human rights. 
 
The U.S. was driven to reach these objectives in the region and stayed confident with its 
vision of a free and open Asia-Pacific, because the ‘history is on the side of the free – 
free societies, free governments, free economies, free people’ (Obama 2011). Obama 
argued, that to be the ideology the U.S. leadership and the formation of the alliances and 
the partnerships were based upon. 
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These remarks articulated the first intentions behind the U.S. strategy towards Asia-
Pacific. The approach was diplomatic and carefully worded, making clear the 
opportunities and positive consequences of U.S. influence in the region, yet subtly 
discussing the regional concerns and threats. The sources of such regional issues were 
not, however, as directly discussed. For example, ideological differences in politics, 
such as democracy versus communism, in Asia-Pacific were acknowledged but there 
was no linkage to the Chinese Communist Party. This approach did not properly address 
the underlying challenges in Asia-Pacific nor discussed them from a realistic 
perspective. When the remarks did not directly identify the actual reasons behind 
potential regional instabilities which made the strategy, and the action plans sound 
vague. 
 
In conclusion, there was a direct and an indirect discussion revolving around China. 
Directly, China was discussed in an optimistic tone, with a strong focus on cooperative 
relationship. Indirectly, the remarks discussed the failures of communist governments, 
the importance of protecting civil societies, and the intentions behind adversarial 
military modernization that threatened the regional stability and security. However, 
these notions were targeted to adversary nations, and were not directly associated with 
China. Nevertheless, in the light of regional events, these issues were applicable 
towards China.  
 
The direct illocutionary intentions of the text portray liberal concepts by emphasizing 
cooperation and sustaining fair trade. However, as for indirect illocutionary intentions, 
the remarks indicated notions of realism: an ideological threat was said to be 
challenging global security and stability. While the remarks avoid direct accusations, 
the indirect illocutionary acts in the remarks strongly position China and its actions as a 
concern to the United States. These remarks show the gradual transition of the Chine 
discourse from constructive engagement and inclusion to an open – yet still indirect – 
threat assessment which occurred during the Obama administration. 
 
6.2 Trump administration 
 
The Trump administration published two main reports concerning the Indo-Pacific 
region. During Trump’s presidency ‘Indo-Pacific’ replaced the term ‘Asia-Pacific’, used 
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by the Obama administration, to reflect the importance of including the strategic partner 
India to the overall regional strategy. 
 
The 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report emphasized the preparedness of the U.S. in the 
region and the importance of alliances and partnerships in maintaining U.S. regional 
presence. Through strong networks, the U.S. could deter, counter, or defeat the 
repressive and unfair competitiveness of China. While the purpose of the document was 
to project a strategic approach to the region, it rather acted as an assessment of Chinese 
actions in the region, and the importance of the U.S. networks in containing China’s 
assertiveness. 
 
In 2021, the administration released a declassified version of the United States Strategic 
Framework for the Indo-Pacific accompanied by a statement by the Assistant to the 
President for National Security Affairs. The reason for the strategic framework was to 
further implement the 2017  National Security Strategy for the Indo-Pacific region. The 
bullet pointed document bluntly articulated the future threats and challenges for the 
region, and the U.S. preparedness to defend its hegemonic position. The aggressiveness 
of Chinese behavior was the key concern addressed in the strategic framework and in 
the statement. 
 
6.2.1 Indo-Pacific Strategic Report 
 
The Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR) was published by the U.S. Department of 
Defense in June 2019. The report, entitled ‘Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a 
Networked Region’, emphasized the importance of U.S. preparedness, presence, and 
alliances in the region. The shared vision of the Indo-Pacific region was for each nation 
to enjoy sovereignty, while pursuing economic prosperity by following shared rules and 
norms. However, according to the Department of Defense, the stability of the region 
was challenged by the repressive and competitive nature of China’s behavior. (IPSR 
2019.) Therefore, the aim of the U.S. articulated in the IPSR was to counter this malign 
behavior by developing its defense mechanism and strengthening its alliances and 
partnerships. Together, they would deter those who undermine the rules-based 
international order. (IPSR 2019.) 
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Both the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2018 National Defense 
Strategy (NDS) of the Trump administration articulated the U.S. preparedness to tackle 
the complex security concerns in the Indo-Pacific region. The IPSR was formulated 
based on them, thus it follows the similar patterns and tones of these two strategies. 
While the IPSR acted as an overall guidance to the whole region, it did single out China 
as the primary challenge for regional stability and approached regional challenges from 
a perspective based on realism: China was the number one competitor in all domains. 
Therefore, from the very beginning of the IPSR, China was bluntly stated as a threat to 
U.S. national security, as well as a threat to the economic prosperity and the freedom of 
nations regionally and globally, reflecting the notions of ‘the China Threat’ and 
securitization. The Secretary of Defense Patrick M. Shanahan in his forewords declared 
that China, under the guidance of the Chinese Communist Party, aimed to reorganize 
the regional balance in its favor through influencing operations, unfair trade practices, 
and its military modernization (IPSR 2019). 
 
The report highlighted the goodwill of the United States in advocating China’s inclusion 
in international organizations, such as the World Trade Organization, in the hopes that 
China would integrate to the international community and contribute to the common 
prosperity. However, according to the IPSR, while China did enjoy the benefits joining 
the international system offered, the Chinese Communist Party undermined common 
rules and took advantage of other nations. By spreading its malign influence, rooted in 
contradicting ideology and propaganda, China has violated the norms and threatens the 
sovereignty of others. Even within its own borders, the Communist Party has 
discriminated, mistreated, and violated the rights and freedom of its people, values that 
strongly contradict those promoted by the U.S. and its allies. (IPSR 2019, 8-9.) 
 
Globally, China’s cyber campaigns and militarization had caused tensions. Even during 
the Obama administration, the Chinese government was accused of cyber theft 
campaigns targeting the intellectual properties and technological information of foreign 
companies, American enterprises included. For the past decade, China’s military 
modernization has been noted: the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had spread its 
military bases globally, and regionally increased its presence in the South China Sea 
and surrounding Taiwan. According to the Department of Defense, the aim of the 
Chinese militarization was to achieve first regional hegemony, and later global 
dominance. This indicated that the perception of the rise of China and the ‘China 
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Threat’ extended beyond the regional concerns of Indo-Pacific. Now China was 
threatening the West with its military investments by improving its power projection, 
engaging in complex cyberspace operations, and by developing capabilities to block any 
access near China’s borders. According to the IPSR, these notions threatened the 
common vision of free and secure Indo-Pacific. The sovereignty violations and 
aggressive military presence in the South and East China Seas gradually threatened the 
regional stability. Especially the military tension with Taiwan raised concerns in the 
report. (IPSR 2019, 8-9.) 
 
Among the main concerns of the U.S. was the economic competition between the two 
nations, and especially the unfair trade practices China has used to advance its economic 
agenda. For example, the report argued that through penalties, military threats, 
espionage, theft, and diversion China has acquired its economic advantage and 
maintained its unfair trade agreements with other nations. (ISPR 2019, 9.) The report 
further emphasized that when nations prosper and spread their economic influence, it 
often brings along benefits for other nations as well, but with China, some of its 
economic investments have had negative effects to others, while greatly benefitting 
China itself. The Department of Defense judged these unfair practices advocated by 
China, which take advantage of many rising economies in the region, as well as 
globally. According to the IPSR, many nations have reported concerns of inconsistency, 
bribery, price manipulation, and unfair debt repayment obligations when dealing with 
China. (IPSR 2019, 9-10.) 
 
Nevertheless, the U.S. emphasized that it did not aim to restrict China’s fair and 
transparent investments or operations, yet it wished to articulate the concerns and 
inconsistencies in China’s practices, such as China converting bilateral economic deals 
to granting PLA military access to these nations. According to the report, this coercive 
and aggressive behavior was reflected to all ends of the world. (IPSR 2019, 9-10.) It 
was not the economic and military actions per se that concerned the U.S., at least 
according to the IPSR, but the lack of transparency in China’s behavior. This lacking 
reflects China’s actions for a more threatening perspective, and this was how China was 
pictured in this report as well. Rather than bringing forth the positive aspects of China’s 
prosperity, it focused on a threat perception, deepening the gap between ‘us’ (the U.S. 
and its allies) and ‘them’ (China). 
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To control regional tension, an important objective of the U.S. was to develop the 
military relations and the transparency in the communication between the U.S. and 
China. The Chinese military, challenging that of the U.S. in its capabilities, and its 
modernization has forced the U.S. to develop and innovate its military to effectively 
deter aggression and coercion the PLA poses. The regional uncertainty caused by the 
military modernization has increased the risk of misunderstandings and conflicts, which 
is why the strategic and policy dialogues initiated by the U.S. were considered 
necessary. To counter the malign behavior of China, the U.S. has pursued a constructive 
and cooperative relationship. Nevertheless, according to the IPSR, the U.S was willing 
to cooperate with China, if its actions contributed to the regional and global stability and 
prosperity. (IPSR 2019, 10.) 
 
The U.S. was prepared to defend and support its allies and partners from the aggressive 
campaigns of China. Especially in the case of Taiwan, the U.S. was committed to the 
Taiwan Relations Act, which has contributed to the regional stability and prosperity. 
The ultimate objective of China was to unify Taiwan with the mainland, and it was 
pursuing means to pressure and intimidate Taiwan with economic and military actions. 
For example, economically, China used economic leverage on other nations, trying to 
influence their diplomatic partnerships with Taiwan. Due to this economic pressure, in 
2018 Taiwan lost three diplomatic partners to China. In military actions, China 
increased its presence in the Taiwan Strait, leaving the area conflict prone. (IPSR 2019, 
31.) These Chinese actions violated the values of freedom and security the IPSR and the 
United States promoted. Therefore, the U.S. was committed to aiding Taiwan in its 
defense developments to deter China’s aggression. (ISPR 2019.) 
 
The IPSR constitutes as a blunt threat assessment of China’s action in the Indo-Pacific 
region. The U.S. was prepared to defend the region’s stability from the aggressive and 
malign intentions of China, and from its numerous campaigns used to achieve regional 
hegemony. China’s methods were described as aggressive, threatening, and challenging 
to the liberal international order the U.S. promoted. Like in the NSS and the NDS 
reports, in the IPSR China was portrayed as a revisionist and an assertive power, that 
spreads its malign influence and propaganda. In addition to China, Russia, North Korea, 
and transnational challengers (extreme terrorism, for example) were considered as 
threats to regional and U.S. security. (IPSR 2019.) However, they were significantly 
less discussed in the report, unlike China, which was the primary subject articulated 
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under regional trends and challenges. The report itself reflected an ‘us versus them’ 
assessment, where the U.S. with its alliances and partners were positioned against the 
threatening and rogue states of China, Russia, and North Korea. 
 
The IPSR articulated the challenges China poses to the community in Indo-Pacific in a 
straightforward and realist manner. It lacked the diplomatic approach familiar in the 
documents of the Obama administration, and the discrete and careful tone used when 
discussing China-related issues. The Trump administration abandoned the indirect 
indications of the diplomatic etiquette and openly discussed the challenges China poses 
to the U.S. regional hegemony.  
 
The document created an image of a threatening and an aggressive China, which wishes 
to reshape the world according to its revisionist values. By accusing China of regional 
instability and projecting a future where – if the nations in the region do not resist – 
China will rule by intimidation and extortion. Hence, the U.S. seemed to appeal to these 
nations to choose a side between good and evil. The document bluntly portrayed China 
in a negative light, clearly stating the message of the United States: the nations are in a 
strategic competition, and the U.S. will not accept another hegemon in the Indo-Pacific.  
 
6.2.2 United States Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific 
 
 In January 2021, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Robert C. 
O’Brien published a statement concerning the newly declassified United States 
Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific. The document worked as a specified 
guidance for implementing the 2017 NSS in the Indo-Pacific region. The release of the 
framework indicated the directedness the administration wanted to reflect when it came 
to dealing with national security and defense commitments. Even though the report 
focused on the Indo-Pacific region as a whole, the competitive relationship with China 
had a major role in the report and in the regional strategy was seemingly built around it. 
 
According to the statement entitled Free and Open Indo-Pacific, the framework worked 
as a basis for campaigns concerning actions and policies related to Indo-Pacific. As an 
example, the statement introduced strategic reports, such as the U.S. Strategic Approach 
to the People’s Republic of China, the U.S. Strategic Framework for Countering 
China’s Economic Aggression, and the U.S. Campaign Plan for Countering China’s 
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Malign Influence in International Organizations. (Free and Open Indo-Pacific 2021.) 
As no other reports were mentioned by name, the framework seemed to act as a 
strategic approach towards China alone, rather than a general strategic approach to the 
region itself. The titles of the aforementioned reports indicated that China was 
considered not only as a competitive challenger to the U.S., but as a malign and 
aggressive actor in a global scale and in multiple fields. 
 
In the statement, the Chinese Communist Party was positioned as the main cause of the 
regional instability due to its violations against the freedom and sovereignty of other 
nations, and the revisionist nature of its behavior. O’Brien argued that the regional 
approach of the U.S. was different from that of China, as the aim of U.S. was to ensure 
that all nations could preserve their freedom, rather than restrict, control, and dominate 
the regional processes. (Free and Open Indo-Pacific 2021.) The message conveyed in 
the statement of Free and Open Indo-Pacific was that the nations of Indo-Pacific should 
rely on the American leadership based on liberty and join the U.S. in counterattacking 
the violating and repressive ideologies spread by China. 
 
The declassified United States Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific itself was a 
document explaining the primary challenges and interests for the U.S. concerning the 
security of the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, it reflected the plans of action for the 
U.S. to pursue its regional objectives. When observed in its entirety, however, the 
Framework seemed like an action plan to hinder the hegemonic nature of the rise of 
China. 
 
The document started by stating the three primary issues challenging the U.S. national 
security: defeating the revisionist influence of China by promoting liberal U.S. values in 
Indo-Pacific; minimizing the threat North Korea posed to U.S. and its allies; and 
advancing and maintaining U.S. economic leadership. The very first bullet point of the 
document noted the malign and revisionist threats China poses to the liberal economic 
order, and how the U.S. aimed to counter the China threat, as the prosperity of the U.S. 
was stated to depend on the U.S. maintaining its regional and global leadership. (U.S. 
Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific 2021, 1.) 
 
The following chapter in the framework introduced the regional (and global) 
assumptions the U.S. had concerning the Indo-Pacific region. Out of the 14-point list, 
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China was mentioned in 8 of them. The remaining 6 points concerned the formation of 
alliances to deter conflict, territorial disputes, and shifts in regional balance, which all 
could be linked to China. The strategic competition between the two nations was 
acknowledged, as are the ideological differences in the fields of politics and economy. 
The threat China posed, and its spreading influence, challenged the U.S. by negatively 
impacting the economic prosperity and the national security of the nation, as well as its 
alliances and partners. (U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific 2021, 2.) 
 
According to the framework, the U.S. believed that China aimed to distort the 
relationship between the U.S. and its alliances and partnerships, recreate regional and 
international rules and norms for its own benefit, posed military threats all across the 
region, malignly gained access to intellectual property and eventually an advantage in 
the field of technology, and repressed its own people and other free societies (U.S. 
Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific 2021, 2). 
 
In its action plans, the U.S. shared the commitments it is willing to make to reach the 
desired objectives. For example, concerning alliances and partnerships, the U.S. was 
warning other nations about the ‘strings attached’ in the Chinese Belt and Road 
Initiative, reflecting the aggressive economic plans of China. According to the 
framework, the U.S. aimed to enhance its diplomacy to counter the illusion created by 
Chinese disinformation that the regional hegemony of China cannot be prevented. As 
for Taiwan, which is one of the key conflict topics in the U.S.-China relations, the U.S. 
continued to loudly support the development of the Taiwanese defense mechanism to 
deter Chinese aggressive behavior on its shores. (U.S. Strategic Framework for the 
Indo-Pacific 2021, 4-5.) 
 
Countering China’s growing influence had an action plan of its own, mainly focusing 
on issues concerning the economy, the ideological differences, and the military 
modernization. Economically, the U.S. pursued free and open Indo-Pacific. China 
threatened this vision with its unfair trade practices rooted from the Chinese Communist 
Party’s desire to dominate the field at all costs. The U.S. objective to counter the 
economic issues focuses on building a regional consensus to reveal such unfair 
practices. As for maintaining the advantage in technology and innovation, the U.S. 
would prevent China from the acquisition of U.S. strategic capabilities and monitor its 
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investments in the United States. (U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific 2021, 
6.) 
 
Ideologically, the U.S. kept promoting values of democracy, liberty, and human rights 
throughout the region through the development of public diplomacy to point out the 
benefits of such values. This was to counter the repressive ideologies of China and to 
maintain the U.S. influential sphere. Militarily, the U.S. was deterring the threats the 
Chinese military modernization posed by denying Chinese dominance and defending 
partners from Chinese coercion by spreading knowledge about the malign intentions of 
Chinese behavior, especially in its intelligence activities. (U.S. Strategic Framework for 
the Indo-Pacific 2021, 7-8.) 
 
Nevertheless, the U.S. welcomed a cooperative relationship with China. According to 
the framework, the previous cooperation attempts had been more beneficial on China’s 
behalf, therefore, reciprocally the U.S. aimed to negotiate a relationship based on 
constructive and results-oriented diplomacy (U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-
Pacific 2021, 8).  
 
Since the Trump administration had had no issues with directly addressing China-
related issues, it is not surprising that the U.S. Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific 
was straightforwardly addressed towards China. It followed notions of the National 
Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy of the Trump administration and 
addressed the same issues: in the pursue of ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’, the U.S. aimed 
to widen the gap between ‘us’ (the U.S., its allies, and partners) and ‘them’ (China). 
 
The terminology concerning China was negative and accusive, as its actions were 
described as ‘exploiting’, ‘challenging’, ‘dominating’, ‘damaging’, ‘asserting’, and 
‘compelling’. To reach the desired regional end-states, the U.S. had to convince its 
allies and partners worldwide to resist China, its malign influence, and its unfair 
bilateral and multilateral agreements. Only through a strong network of like-minded 
partners the revisionist and coercive China could be countered. (U.S. Strategic 
Framework for the Indo-Pacific 2021, 3.) 
 
Even though throughout the report the tone of discussion was negative, it did offer an 
ultimatum for China to cooperate (in agreements preferable to the U.S.), showing a 
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contradictory aspect of the hegemonic struggle. The U.S. clearly aimed to maintain its 
leadership by not allowing China to acquire too much of a foothold in the region. In 
accordance with the power transition theory (by for example Friedman 2011), the U.S. – 
by encircling and further disengaging China from its neighbors – hinders the spread of 
Chinese influence, preventing China from controlling the region. Judging by the tone of 
the report, the U.S. seems to rely on its allies and partners to resist China’s aggressive 
behavior by emphasizing how China has taken advantage of them and the international 
organizations, and how China as a regional leader, unlike in the U.S.-led system, would 
prove to be less beneficial to its neighbors. 
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7. Analysis and Discussion 
 
 This chapter discusses the perspectives in which China has been discussed in U.S. 
administrative documents in the areas of U.S. national security, U.S. national defense, 
and regional U.S. strategies towards Asia in relation to international relations theories. 
The findings are discussed in a chronological order, starting from the first Quadrennial 
Defense Review of the Obama administration in 2010 and finishing with the U.S. 
Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific, published during the final month of Trump’s 
presidency in January 2021. During this decade, the administrative discourse on China 
has undergone a significant change from optimistic cooperation to strategic competition.  
The following reflects on the findings of the administrative documents with an intent to 
point out the gradual change in the China discourse from optimistic liberalism to 
defensive realism. Therefore, the documents are discussed in a chronological order, 
rather than thematically.  
 
The findings are divided into two subsections: the China discussion in the documents 
and remarks of the Obama administration, the China discussion in the documents of the 
Trump administration, and a discussion on the major differences between these two 
administrations. In addition, the following subchapters reflect the tone of the discussion: 
in the terms of terminology, how does the documents portray China? Are there clear 
correlations to different international relations theories? In essence, the aim is to answer 
research questions and articulate the perspectives in which China is discussed in 
different documents and analyze the tone in which its actions are described.  
 
7.1 The Obama Administration 
 
In the documents conducted by the Obama administration, the general discussion 
concerning China remained optimistic. Throughout Obama’s presidency, the Sino-U.S. 
relations were observed from a perspective of constructive cooperation: all the 
documents observed for this thesis emphasized on the importance of cooperation, and 
especially on maintaining an open communication in military relations. Globally, China 
was expected to continue its integration to the international system and organizations 
and assume a share of global responsibilities. The overall tone of the discussion 
concerning China remained diplomatically neutral and reflective, and the possible 
tensions and threats were discussed carefully without a risk of misinterpretation or 
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provocation. Gradually, the potential threats posed by China were discussed more 
frequently during the later years of the administration, however, simultaneously 
referring to the opportunities China’s integration would provide regionally and globally. 
The administration avoided addressing China as a cause of any tension or instabilities.  
 
The administration applied strategies of engagement, integration, and strategic hedging 
to complement China’s rise and the spread of its influence. The approach retained 
notions of liberalism, while gradually observing the relationship from a realistic 
perspective. Nevertheless, the documents remained reflective and opportunistic, and 
avoided direct discussion over sensitive issues concerning China. 
 
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) reflected the engagement strategy 
applied by the United States to shape China’s rise. The QDR promoted the liberal 
values advocated by the administration and retained a neutral projection of China. The 
document emphasized on the importance of stable diplomatic and military cooperation 
in the U.S.-China relations, describing it as an essential part of the rebalance strategy. 
While the bilateral cooperation was the focus of the China discussion, the document 
raised concerns toward China’s actions and intentions. Despite the acknowledgement of 
Chinese military modernization and the lack of transparency in government actions, 
these issues were discussed in a careful and diplomatic manner, without direct 
confrontation. In the QDR, China was not considered as an eminent threat to the U.S., 
nor as a challenger of regional hegemony, even as the U.S. had concerns for China’s 
long-term intentions. 
 
The National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2010 acknowledged the rise of China and its 
spreading influence, embracing and welcoming a peaceful and prosperous rise. Here, 
the engagement approach was supported by the integration strategy. In addition, the 
Obama administration firmly discussed the responsibilities of China as an influential 
member of the international system. The China responsibility theory focused on the 
expectations of burden sharing that China should participate in. The 2010 NSS 
thoroughly discussed the responsibilities that were expected of China in an optimistic 
tone, embracing and aspiring China’s inclusion to the community of capable nations.  
 
The administration seemed reluctant to directly discuss sensitive issues in its 
documents. As for the 2010 NSS, the Obama administration did explicate global 
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concerns, yet carefully avoided direct accusations, especially when such an issue could 
be closely linked to China. For example, when discussing governments that restrict 
citizens’ access to information, the NSS referred to hostile or repressive governments, 
rather than to specific nations. The document did not discuss disagreements in the U.S.-
China relations or mention China when discussing sensitive topics, such as global 
human rights violations.  
 
The essay in the Foreign Policy by the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in October 
2011 announced the rebalance strategy, commonly known as ‘the Pivot’, to Asia. The 
article was a direct and realistic approach to answer the regional challenges, especially 
the assertiveness of China. Out of the publications of the Obama administration 
observed for this thesis, the publication by Clinton was the most realistic and 
transparent document, initiating the China challenge. Nevertheless, the emphasis of the 
China discussion was on building a constructive bilateral cooperation, rather than in the 
tensions caused by China. Overall, the essay approached China from a diplomatically 
neutral perspective, carefully avoiding accusations, confrontations, or implying attempts 
of containment. While discussing the potential of China’s behavior and its implications, 
the document emphasized on China self-sabotaging its own potential by undermining 
international rules. 
 
In his remarks to the Australian parliament in November 2011, President Barack Obama 
articulated the U.S. intentions of the rebalance strategy to Asia-Pacific. The remarks 
discussed the same opportunities and concerns articulated in Clinton’s article, yet in a 
vague manner, avoiding direct accusations. The bilateral relations with China were 
addressed to with diplomatic neutrality, with a focus on cooperation. However, the 
remarks articulated regional concerns, such as communism or adversarial military 
modernization in general, but as seemingly was the custom of the Obama 
administration, without identifying the sources of such issues. However, these concerns 
were applicable to China, and especially the military modernization of China was 
relatively directly discussed in other documents, such as the 2010 Quadrennial Defense 
Review. 
 
The article by Clinton and Obama’s remarks both indicated that the U.S. had 
implemented an approach of strategic hedging towards China. With the intention of 
strengthening the relationships with U.S. alliances and partnerships in Asia-Pacific, as 
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well as increasing its own presence in the region, the U.S. had taken realist approaches 
to answer the China challenge. The means were not entirely offensive and especially not 
provocative but have resulted in China taking reciprocal actions. When the 
administration had shifted from an engagement strategy to the rebalance strategy, 
simultaneously it reflected a gradual change in the China discourse from the 
responsibility theory to a China threat theory. While the threat projection was not direct, 
the administration acknowledged the challenges and tension caused by China more 
frequently. However, in the following documents, China’s assertiveness and actions 
were generally discussed in the same careful and discrete manner as before. 
 
This was the case in the Defense Strategic Guidance of 2012. The DSG continued the 
careful observation of China’s action in Asia-Pacific, avoiding direct confrontation of 
issues involving China. However, the gradually prevailing threat perception arose when 
China was directly described, for the first time in the Obama documents observed for 
this thesis, as an adversarial nation challenging the power of the United States. For an 
Obama document, such a realist and direct notion was rare. However, for the rest of the 
document, the China discourse remained optimistic and reflective, and the eventual 
focus of the discussion was on bilateral cooperation. 
 
The 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review continued the reflective tone of the previous 
QD. However, it projected a more cautious approach, reflecting the uncertainty the U.S. 
has towards China’s intentions and recognizing the potential threats it poses. 
Nevertheless, the document remained optimistic, emphasizing the importance of 
bilateral communication to reduce misunderstandings. With the power transition in the 
leadership of China from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping in 2012, the administration hoped to 
establish stronger cooperation and deeper Chinese participation in overcoming regional 
challenges. Despite the minimal threat perception, the main U.S. objective according to 
the 2014 QDR was to support the further integration of China into regional multilateral 
organizations by effectively engaging and supporting its transparent actions. 
 
Gradually, the optimistic discussion towards China’s peaceful rise in the documents of 
the Obama administration shifted towards realism. The 2015 National Security Strategy 
implied that the U.S. was supporting its engagement strategy with the rebalance 
strategy. By announcing its strategy to (indirectly) hedge China by strengthening the 
U.S. military relations with the surrounding nations and increasing its own regional 
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presence, the U.S. was answering to the challenge posed by the rising China. This 
contributed to the formation of a China threat perception. For example, the 2015 NSS 
condemned the threats posed by the Chinese military modernization in the South China 
Sea and the Chinese espionage to the U.S. intellectual property. In this document, the 
U.S. administration was taking on a realist approach to the global challenges, and 
especially those initiated by China, instead of retaining to its diplomatically neutral 
discourse. However, this was occasional. The overall China discourse focused on the 
opportunities China accumulated. Even though partially retaining to realism, the overall 
tone focused on positive outcomes, cooperation, and China’s integration to the 
international community. 
 
Behind the engagement and integration strategies were notions of China’s responsibility 
theory (Jin 2011.) Despite the looming threat perception in specific fields, such as cyber 
security, the Obama administration maintained its attention in constructive cooperation 
and embraced the inclusion of China into international organizations. Therefore, the 
responsibility theory was evident in the Obama documents: the U.S. appealed to China 
in global contributions and participation in burden sharing, like for example, in the 2010 
National Security Strategy. In addition, the administration portrayed more willingness 
to cooperate with China and embraced the opportunities its rise provided. With the 
engagement strategy, this meant that one of U.S aims was to ensure that while China 
grows, so should its contribution to the U.S.-led international community. (Jin 2011.)  
 
Seemingly from the administrative reports, the Obama administration embraced the 
notions of the China responsibility theory, as an integration ‘controlled’ by the U.S. 
would contribute to the secure and stable international order. However, the likes of 
Ikenberry (2012) argue, that China’s fully integration to the U.S.-led international order 
seemed unlikely. The values and ideologies of the Chinese government contradict 
strongly those pursued by the U.S. and liberalism. The opposition of the U.S. values, 
such as democracy and human rights, contributed to the tensions in bilateral relations, 
and gradually the optimism in the Obama documents seemingly transforms to a sterner 
and more realistic approach. Nevertheless, the documents of the Obama administration 
retained diplomatic discretion.  
 
Despite the prevailing optimism in the Obama documents directed at the bilateral 
relations, some academics argue the U.S. is deliberately, yet indirectly, challenging 
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China. According to Zhang Zhexin, the engagement and rebalancing efforts of the U.S. 
in Asia-Pacific in fact contributed to the assertiveness of the rising China. These efforts 
were interpreted as containment efforts, leading China to take actions of its own, for 
example strengthening its position in the South China Sea or initiating the Belt and 
Road Initiative. (Zhang 2019, 3.)  
 
China’s growing assertiveness contributed to what Yan Xuetong calls a ‘theory of 
superficial friendship’ where the two superpowers have created an illusion of 
cooperation – of partnership – to cover the fluctuating relationship. (Yan 2010, 263.) 
The disagreements that arise have been concealed under the illusion of constructive, 
strategic partnership. However, the Obama administration did recognize the 
competitiveness of China, and as reflected in the administrative documents, the U.S. 
aimed to manage this competition with a mixture of engaging, rebalancing, and hedging 
China strategically. 
 
An important part of the bilateral relations was the economic cooperation. In accordance 
with the China’s responsibility theory, China was required to open its markets to foreign 
companies, ensure more political freedom and advance democracy, increase its military 
transparency, and provide diplomatic assistance towards issues of global concern, such 
as nuclear proliferation or environmental issues. However, alongside with ‘the Pivot’, 
and questioning China’s responsibilities, the responsibility theory was challenged. (Jin 
2011.) Especially after the announcement of the rebalance strategy, the U.S. appealed to 
China to fully integrate to the economic international system, with the objective of 
sharing common prosperity.  
 
The Obama documents revealed, for example through cyber security discussions, that 
the ‘China Threat’ theory was showing signs of gradual return as a China discourse in 
the U.S. foreign policy already before the Trump administration. While in the earlier 
report, the U.S. was optimistic that China would contribute to the global 
responsibilities, it was evident in the later Obama documents that the U.S. had adopted a 
more realist stance. The rebalancing strategy and strengthening regional alliances 
implied that more pressure was placed on China to comply with the international rules. 
China’s reluctance to do so contributed to the threat theory, as was witnessed during the 
Trump administration.  
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7.1 The Trump Administration 
 
While the Obama administration remained diplomatically discrete in its China 
discourse, the Trump administration abandoned the cooperation-focused strategies of 
the previous administration. Instead, the Trump administration bluntly declared a 
competition-based strategy to meet the China challenge. Based on offensive realism, the 
general approach of the administration was to directly discuss the bilateral relations and 
the global affairs as the U.S. administration sees it: China, by exploitation and through 
unfair practices, was challenging the hegemonic position of the United States. In its 
documents, the administration described its own discourse as a transparent attempt to 
articulate China’s actions and to ensure the U.S. allies and partners saw the malign and 
aggressiveness of China’s intentions. 
 
The Trump administration replaced the engagement strategy with a strategy of 
containment. Despite the notions of welcoming a cooperative China, the Trump 
documents focused on projecting an image of a threatening China. The containment 
strategy was supported by concepts of strategic hedging or plain isolation attempts. 
Containment was not proclaimed as an official strategy. However, the actions of the 
administration reflected containment attempts. Basing its strategy on realism, the 
administration conducted multiple documents concerning China, and straightforwardly 
discussed the impact of its actions on the national security of the United States. Unlike 
the Obama administration, the Trump administration maintained a provocative and 
accusive tone in its China discourse, abandoning notions of diplomacy, and focusing on 
risqué discussion. Seemingly, the Trump administration neglected the cultural factors in 
international relations: the direct and accusing approach of the U.S. was not necessarily 
embraced by the Chinese government, like in the case of Trump speculating the origin 
of the Covid-19 pandemic (whether accidental or intentional) or calling it the ‘Chinese 
virus’. 
 
After the inauguration of Trump, the Sino-U.S. relations seemed to get a promising start 
(Trump 2017). However, despite portraying an image of building bilateral 
understanding and trust with China, the 2017 National Security Strategy was a direct 
declaration of China as a threat to the U.S. in all domains. Based on realism, the 2017 
NSS confronted China and the challenges its actions pose globally. Therefore, the 
document focused on articulating the shift from bilateral cooperation to competition. 
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Additionally, the threat perception was evident: China was described as an aggressive 
nation with a goal of global hegemony and the replacement of U.S. values and 
international norms with its own. The 2017 NSS set the tone for the following 
documents concerning China and acted as a foundation for the U.S. approach to China 
and the Indo-Pacific region.  
 
The 2018 National Defense Strategy, which came to replace the Quadrennial Defense 
Review, emphasized the effect China has on the current global leadership position of the 
United States. The document discussed the U.S. preparedness to defends it hegemony, 
and reciprocally containing China’s assertiveness. The NDS reflected the power 
transition theory by justifying the U.S. leadership while attempting to contain or restrict 
the spread of China’s influence. 
 
The Trump administration reflected a threat assessment of China from a point of 
provocation and accusation, projecting China in a negative perspective. China was 
described not only as the enemy of the United States, but as a challenger of the 
international system. Nevertheless, the document articulated the need for reciprocal 
understanding in bilateral military relations. This seemed contradictory to the proclaims 
of countering China’s actions and implement containment by applying the hedging 
strategy by strengthening regional alliances and partnerships. 
 
The 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (IPSR) continued the China threat assessment. 
The report focused on China’s action in the Indo-Pacific, and how the U.S. is prepared 
to defend the U.S.-led international order from Chinese influence. In the document, 
China was described as an aggressive, threatening, and assertive revisionist power 
challenging the liberal international system by spreading its malign influence and 
propaganda. By challenging the U.S. hegemony, China had become the number one 
national security threat for the United States. According to the theory of securitization 
and in the light of realism, Trump administration projected China as a threat to national 
security and throughout the IPSR (and other documents) looked for means to justify the 
projection. 
   
The administration continued its realist approach to the challenges posed by China. For 
example, the document accused China of; causing tensions and instability in Indo-
Pacific; using extorsion and intimidation to bind regional nations into unfair 
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agreements; and pursuing a reshaped international community to match the ideologies 
of the Chinese Communist Party. The tension was multiplied by both the U.S. and 
China reciprocally announcing tariffs, travel restrictions, or other means to hinder the 
processes of another. According to the IPSR, the strategic competition between the two 
superpowers demanded the U.S. to implement containment – or disengagement – 
strategies to protect its leadership position. 
 
The juxtaposition continued in the 2020 strategic report, the  U.S. Strategic Approach to 
the People’s Republic of China. The document had a clear positioning of ‘us’ and 
‘them’, with the United States continuing to justify its hegemonic position by promoting 
a threat perception of China. Additionally, by appealing to its allies and partners, the 
U.S. tried to isolate China regionally. Unfortunately, for the sake of the U.S. as well as 
regional nations, isolating China was impossible due to interdependence. In one way or 
another, all nations were interlinked to China, and therefore, could not completely 
abandon relations with it without harming their economies. Therefore, U.S. could not 
rely on its allies and partners to join in containment efforts, despite the detailed strategic 
approach to control China’s assertiveness. 
 
The bilateral relations remained competitive to the end of the presidency of Trump. 
During his final month in January 2021, the administration published the U.S. Strategic 
Framework for the Indo-Pacific. The document followed the outlines of the previous 
reports by the Trump administration observed for this thesis: further isolating China 
from the allies and partners of the United States. The strategic framework described 
China’s actions as exploiting, challenging, dominating, damaging, asserting, and 
compelling. The China threat perception appeared to be the main theme in the 
document, and the main objective was to counter China’s malign rise. 
 
The documents by the Trump administration all followed a similar pattern: basing its 
assumptions on realism, the administration portrayed China’s rise as a threat for the 
U.S. national security, for regional stability, and for global prosperity. As an 
international theory, realism argues that all nations constantly seek power and, 
therefore, were not content with the status quo. (Mearsheimer 2018.) Thus, for China to 
pursue regional hegemony was only a natural consequence of the global affairs. 
According to offensive realism, due to the power competition, a conflict between China 
and the United States is inevitable. Therefore, a natural reaction from the U.S. is to 
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defend its leadership position by constraining and containing China’s rise. 
(Mearsheimer 2018.) This is well reflected in all the documents of the Trump 
administration.  For example, in the 2019 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, where the U.S. 
explicated its defense strategy against China’s regional expansion, or the U.S. Strategic 
Approach to the People’s Republic of China, in which the U.S. built an image of a 
threatening China and appealed to the U.S. allies and partners to resist China and its 
unfair practices. 
 
The threat perception, or the formation of the China threat theory (Jin 2011), was the 
main theme in the documents of the Trump administration. According to Buzan (2010), 
when the U.S. projected China as a strategic competitor and reflected an image of an 
aggressive hegemonic challenger, they in fact contributed to China’s unpeaceful rise. 
From a realist perspective, it is therefore only a natural consequence for China to 
respond more provokingly to the accusations, leading to an endless cycle of reciprocal 
containment efforts from both sides. In its administrative documents, the Trump 
administration consistently projected negative perspectives of China and appealed to 
U.S allies and partners to adjust their relationships with China accordingly, like the 
United States has: a relationship based on realism and competition. In documents such 
as the 2017 National Security Strategy or the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the U.S. 
articulated actions necessary to contain and control China’s rise, and to ensure it will 
not threaten to replace the U.S. regional or global leadership position. 
 
The fear of China growing strong enough to challenge the U.S. hegemonic position was 
evident in the Trump documents for a couple of reasons. First, the fact that the Trump 
administration issued documents specifically aimed at China, such as the U.S. Strategic 
Approach to the People’s Republic of China, which articulated the need for a 
containment strategy. Second, the regionally focused reports, like the U.S. Strategic 
Framework for the Indo-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report reflect the hedging 
strategy: these documents appealed to the networks of allies and partners to counter 
Chinese practices. Finally, the documents concerning the national security and 
preparedness of the U.S. bluntly projected an image of a threatening and aggressive 
China, which actions were harmful to the security and prosperity of the United States. 
Hence, in the documents, the Trump administration was consistently articulating for the 




The documents especially discussed the concerns toward the spread of Chinese 
ideology. The values and ideologies promoted by China counter the prevailing 
ideologies maintained by the Western powers. According to He Kai, China’s rise poses 
challenges on the existing international order, which will gradually result in a conflict 
between the hegemon and the rising power. Unlike Trump, Obama had a more liberal 
approach in his engagement strategy, which was based on the hopes that global 
economic interdependence will prevent China from aggressive behavior and disturbance 
of the international order. (He 2017, 133-135.) However, China’s unwillingness to 
accept and the eagerness to alter the international norms and values to its favor 
contribute to a ‘Power transition theory’. According to this theory, a rising power will 
not comply to the constricting international regime maintained by the ruling power, but 
aims to change this unjust system, which eventually, at least in many cases, has led to a 
great war. (Friedman 2011.) 
 
The China discussion in the Trump documents reflected the fear of a power transition: 
the administration identified China’s actions as attempts to replace and challenge the 
U.S. in multiple fields. Therefore, the aspects in which China was discussed projected 
the attempts to contain or restrict China’s actions and appealed to other nations to do the 
same. 
 
Graham Allison (2019) refers to this situation as the Thucydides’ Trap: when the rising 
power is challenging the hegemonic position of the existing power, tensions are 
inevitable. According to his research, in the past 500 years, 16 times a rising power has 
challenged the existing hegemon. Of these 16 times, 12 have resulted in war. (Allison 
2019.) Therefore, from the perspective of realism, a conflict between the U.S. and China 
is considered likely. The Trump documents indicated concerns towards both Taiwan 
and North Korea, which according to Allison (2019) could potentially function as the 
initiators of a Sino-U.S. military conflict. Especially the mainland’s unification attempts 
with Taiwan, which have turned more aggressive by the year, matched with the 
increasing U.S. military regional presence and defense cooperation with Taiwan 
increases tensions in the region. 
 
As the Trump administration projected China as a threat to the national security of the 
United States, the administrative documents reflected concern towards China’s military 
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modernization and global expansion. Therefore, the Trump administration discussed 
China’s assertiveness by emphasizing the threats its posed. Seemingly, the documents 
were justifications on why others should see China as a threat to global security and 
prosperity. The theory of securitization explains this phenomenon. According to Vuori 
(2008) and Buzan (2010), through suggesting, requesting, and explaining, an 
administration justifies national threats, and their actions towards it. For example, the 
Trump administration used means of provocation, declaration, and accusation to 
identify China as a threat, without necessarily justifying its claims based on China’s 
actions. In the documents, it was the mere existence of China that alone jeopardized the 
stability of the international order. Seemingly, the administration of Trump realized this, 
and therefore, articulated plans of action to contain China’s malign behavior. 
 
The securitization theory suggests that the political elite can project anything as a 
national threat without necessarily having to provide concrete proof: the accusation is 
based on verbal justification by the political elite. (Vuori 2008.) For example, the 
Trump administration seemingly relied on accusation of and assumptions on Chinese 
intentions, focusing on the creation of a threatening image of China’s capabilities in the 
future, rather than basing its proclamations on events that have taken place. Sure, the 
administration discussed Chinese military modernization, China’s actions at the South 
China Sea, the Belt and Road Initiative, and other actions that China was participating 
in in a realistic manner. However, the reports tended to create colorful connotations of 
the motives behind Chinese actions, therefore, portraying China as a national threat. The 
reports did not necessarily offer much reason for this justification: China was a 
revisionist challenger, and, according to the reports, that alone was a reason why it 




There is a drastic difference in how the Obama and Trump administrations perceived 
China and its role in the international community. The general administrative discourse 
concerning China underwent a change from optimistic and friendly cooperation to a 
struggle to coexist while entangled in a strategic competition. However, the shift from 
engaging with China to confronting and containing it had already gradually begun 
during the Obama administration. During the following Trump administration, the 
competition for the leadership in different domains became so intense it affected both 
countries’ foreign policies. Tensions caused by the strategic competition resulted in 
increasing distrust on both sides. Despite the differences, being the world’s most 
consequential bilateral relationship, the maintenance of open communication in the 
U.S.-China relations has become more important than ever.  
 
The relationship between the U.S. led by the Obama administration and China during 
the power transition from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping in 2013 reflected notions of peaceful 
coexistence. The Obama administration encouraged China’s rise and emphasized the 
importance of a constructive cooperation. The liberal notions were prevailing: with 
integration and engagement, China would become a responsible member of the 
international system, contributing to the prosperity of all nations. On the outside, the 
bilateral relations encouraged openness and (potentially superficial) friendship: the 
strong interdependency was seen to prevent serious conflicts and the Obama 
administration was considerate and respectful of the Chinese culture, and therefore 
careful in its actions. The illocutionary intention was to maintain a neutral image of 
China.  
 
However, closing on the final years of the Obama administration, the administrative 
documents begun to discuss China’s strength, actions, and influence with more concern. 
The administration openly discussed global concerns revolving around China, such as 
human rights issues. The discussion, however, clearly avoided establishing a connection 
between the issue and China and tried to remain politically neutral. Directly, the Obama 
administration advocated an optimistic, friendly, and peaceful relationship. The 
illocutionary intentions reflected in the documents, however, remained indirect, 
suggesting a transition to a more superficial relationship.  
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Despite this diplomatic politeness, the China discourse during the Obama administration 
experienced a gradual transition from promoting liberalism through cooperative 
diplomacy to publicly questioning and raising concerns of China’s intentions. The 
narrative of the discussion turned more accusive with a realist perception of the global 
situation. 
 
However, the extent of the concern toward China’s intentions during the Obama 
administration was minimal in comparison to the following Trump administration. 
Quickly after settling into the White House, the Trump administration’s China discourse 
turned from a promising partnership to rivalry, containment, and confrontation. 
Seemingly, the Trump administration had abandoned the approach of diplomatic 
courtesy practiced by the Obama administration. Basing their strategies on realism, the 
administration perceived China’s rise as an aggressive motion to challenge U.S. 
leadership position and, therefore, applied methods of containment to control China’s 
spreading power. Consistently, the Trump administration appealed to foreign nations on 
confronting and isolating China from the international system – an opposing strategy 
from that of the early Obama administration. Additionally, the documents conducted by 
the Trump administration reflected direct illocutionary intentions: the administration 
chose specific terminology to clearly portray China from a negative perspective.  
 
For Trump, China was a revisionist challenger, which exploited the international system 
in its own favor, trying to overshadow the might of the United States. Therefore, the 
strong American initiative of maintaining superiority (‘Make America Great Again’) 
with more confrontational methods, such as the trade war and the technological 
embargos, which lasted to the end of Trump’s presidential term, contributed to the 
bilateral tension. Additionally, the intense accusations and provocations through media 
platforms by President Trump damaged the official diplomatic relationship with its 
bluntness, and by portraying China as America’s enemy in this personal policy.  
 
Naturally offended by the public confrontation, from which the Chinese often steer 
away from, China responded to the public accusations reciprocally, yet in a formal 
manner. The Chinese government, potentially motivated by the media turbulence caused 
by President Trump, has become blunter in its global ambitions. However, the Trump 
administration responded to China’s booming assertiveness by strongly defending its 
leadership positions and creating a threatening image of a power-seeking China.  
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Portraying China in such a perspective clearly functioned as a securitization attempt of 
the Trump administration: the more the public was concerned of the intentions of China, 
the easier it was to justify aggressive China policies. For example, with the accusive 
speculations on the origins of the Covid-19 or the Chinese technological espionage, the 
Trump administration reflected an image of a China as a national security threat and 
remained doing so until the end of Trump’s presidential term in January 2021. 
 
The succeeding Biden administration was left with an estranged relationship with 
China. However, President Biden, who acted as the Vice President to President Obama, 
could have the potential to return the relationship to similar stance of cooperative 
coexistence, as it was during Obama’s presidency. The competition, however, will 
prevail even if the Biden administration could increase trust in the bilateral relations. 
Nevertheless, the U.S. administration should be cautious of China’s growing global 
influence, as while the United States is trying to get its house back in order after the 
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